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In this paper we provide a novel family of stochastic orders, which we call the α, [a, b]-
convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders, that generalizes
second order stochastic dominance. These stochastic orders allow us to compare two
lotteries, where one lottery has a higher expected value and is also riskier than the other
lottery. The α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic orders allow us to derive comparative
statics results for applications in economics and operations research that could not be
derived using previous stochastic orders. We apply our results in consumption-savings
problems, self-protection problems, and in a Bayesian game.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic orders are fundamental in the study of decision making under uncertainty and in the
study of complex stochastic systems. They have been used in various fields, including economics,
finance, operations research, and statistics (for a textbook treatment of stochastic orders and their
applications, see Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002), Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), and Levy (2015)).
In this paper we provide a novel family of stochastic orders, which allows us to compare two random
variables, where one random variable has a higher expected value and is also riskier than the other
random variable.
For instance, consider the following two lotteries Y˜ and X˜ described in Figure 1.
λα 1− λα
Y˜
a b
1
1
X˜
λa+ (1− λ)b
1
Figure 1: Example 1
Lottery Y˜ yields a dollars with probability λα and b dollars with probability 1 − λα where
b > a, λ ∈ [0, 1], and α ≥ 1. Lottery X˜ yields λa+ (1− λ) b dollars with probability 1. If α is not
very high, it is reasonable to assume that most risk-averse decision makers would prefer lottery X˜
over lottery Y˜ . For example, if α = 1.152, λ = 0.5, a = 0, and b = 1, 000, 000, then lottery X˜
yields 500, 000 dollars with probability 1 while lottery Y˜ yields 1, 000, 000 dollars with probability
0.55 and 0 dollars with probability 0.45. Lottery Y˜ has a higher expected value (550, 000 dollars)
than lottery X˜ but a high probability (a probability of 0.45) of receiving 0 dollars. Thus, in
this case, it seems reasonable that most risk-averse decision makers would prefer lottery X˜ over
lottery Y˜ . Note that for every α > 1, lottery Y˜ has a higher expected value and is riskier than
lottery X˜. Thus, standard stochastic orders cannot compare the two lotteries. In particular,
since the expected value of Y˜ is higher than the expected value of X˜, X˜ does not dominate Y˜ in
most popular stochastic orders because these stochastic orders impose a ranking over expectations
to determine whether X˜ dominates Y˜ . In particular, X˜ does not dominate Y˜ in the second
order stochastic dominance (Hadar and Russell (1969) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)), third
order stochastic dominance (Whitmore, 1970), higher order stochastic dominance (Ekern, 1980),
decreasing absolute risk aversion stochastic dominance (Vickson, 1977), or in the almost second
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order stochastic dominance (Leshno and Levy, 2002). In Section 2.2, however, we show that the
stochastic orders provided in this paper can compare X˜ and Y˜ .
In this paper we provide a novel family of stochastic orders indexed by α, [a, b] where α ≥
1 and [a, b] is a subset of R, which we call the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave
increasing stochastic orders. The family of α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders generalizes
second order stochastic dominance (SOSD),1 which corresponds to the 1, [a, b]-concave increasing
stochastic order. The main idea of the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders is that the
inequality E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] is required to hold only for a subset of the concave and increasing
functions (and not for all of them) in order to determine that a random variable Y dominates a
random variable X in the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order. In particular, the inequality
E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] is not required to hold for a function u that is affine or for a function u
that is “nearly affine” in the sense that the elasticity of u′ with respect to u is bounded below
by a number that depends on α (here u′ is the derivative of u, see Section 2.2 for a precise
statement). More precisely, let α ≥ 1 and let [a, b] be a set in R. Normalize u(b) = 0 for
every u : [a, b] → R. We say that Y dominates X in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic
order if for every decreasing function u : [a, b] → R such that u 1α is convex (functions we call
α, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions) we have E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)]. Similarly, Y dominates X in the
α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order if for every increasing function u : [a, b]→ R such that
(−u) 1α is convex we have E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] (recall that we normalize u(b) = 0 so −u is positive
when u is increasing). For every α > 1, the inequality E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] is not required to hold
for linear functions nor for a convex function u such that u
1
α is not convex in order to determine
that Y dominates X in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order. Thus, domination in the
α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order requires that the expected utility of the “more convex”
functions in the set of all convex functions be higher under Y than under X. When α is higher, we
require that E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] hold for a smaller subset of functions, and thus, the α, [a, b]-convex
decreasing stochastic order is weaker when α grows.
An important feature of the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic
orders is that for α > 1, Y dominating X in these orders does not imply that E[Y ] has to be lower
than E[X], nor does it imply the opposite. In Section 2.2 we provide examples of random variables
X and Y where X has a higher expected value and is riskier than Y , and Y dominates X in the
α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order. For instance, in Section 2.2, we show that X˜ dominates
1Recall that Y dominates X in the second order stochastic dominance if E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] holds for every
concave and increasing function u : [a, b]→ R.
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Y˜ in the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order for the example presented in Figure 1.
For general random variables it is not trivial to check whether a random variable dominates
another random variable in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic
orders. For an integer α, we provide a sufficient condition for domination in the α, [a, b]-convex
decreasing stochastic order that is based on an integral inequality (see Section 2.4). Similar con-
ditions are used to determine whether a random variable dominates another random variable in
other popular stochastic orders. In Section 2.5 we study the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions
that are thrice differentiable. We characterize a well known stochastic order that is based on the
semi-variance functions (these functions are also called lower partial second moment, see Bawa
(1975) and Fishburn (1976)). We show that E[max(c− Y, 0)2] ≥ E[max(c−X, 0)2] for all c ∈ [a, b]
if and only if E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for every u such that −u is a 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing function
and u has a positive third derivative. Thus, we characterize the maximal set that agrees with the
stochastic order that is generated by the semi-variance functions (see more details in Section 2.5).
A decision maker’s utility function’s third derivative being positive implies that the decision maker
prefers positive skewness over negative skewness. This property is appealing from a decision theory
point of view (see Menezes et al. (1980)).
To illustrate the usefulness of the family of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave in-
creasing stochastic orders, we derive novel comparative statics results in three applications. The
first application is a two-period consumption-savings problem with labor income uncertainty. It is
well known that a prudent agent (i.e., an agent whose utility function has a positive third deriva-
tive) saves more if the labor income risk increases in the sense of SOSD (see Leland (1968)). It is
also easy to establish that the agent’s current savings increase if the labor income’s expected present
value increases. We do not know of any comparative statics results for the case when both the
present value and the risk of future labor income increase. We show that under certain conditions
on the agent’s marginal utility, if the labor income risk is higher in the sense of the 2, [a, b]-convex
decreasing stochastic order, then the agent saves more under the riskier labor income. That is, the
precautionary saving motive is stronger than the permanent income motive. This result is useful
for analyzing how an increase in the risk of future labor income together with an increase in the
expected present value of future labor income influence savings decisions.
The second application deals with self-protection problems. We consider a standard self-
protection problem (e.g., Ehrlich and Becker (1972)) where choosing a higher action is more costly
but reduces the probability of a loss. The choice whether to increase or decrease the level of
self-protection can be complicated and is not monotone with the level of risk-aversion (see Dionne
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and Eeckhoudt (1985)). This is because an increase in the level of self-protection might increase
the risk of future loss, and at the same time, might decrease the expected value of future loss.
Stochastic orders can be used as a tool to decide whether the level of self-protection should be
higher or lower. For a decision maker that make decisions according to the decision rule implied
by the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order, we provide conditions that imply a lower level
of self-protection.
In our third application, we show that the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order can be
used in a non-cooperative framework as well. We consider the search model studied in Diamond
(1982) and in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). In this model, there are two players that exert a costly
effort to achieve a match, and the probability of a match occurring depends on the effort exerted
by both. We assume that one agent has private information about the cost of his effort. This
represents a case with a long-lived agent, whose cost function is common knowledge, interacting
with a new entrant whose cost function is private information. We study how different beliefs
regarding the entrant’s cost function affect the equilibrium probability of matching. Under certain
technical conditions, we show that if there is a shift in the beliefs about the entrant’s cost function,
in the sense of the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order, then the equilibrium probability of
matching increases.
The α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders are also useful
in proving inequalities that involve convex functions. To show the usefulness of these stochastic
orders in proving inequalities, we prove a novel Hermite-Hadamard type inequality for decreasing
functions u : [a, b]→ R such that the square root of u(x)− u(b) is convex (see Section 3.4).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 we discuss previous stochastic orders that are
related to the stochastic orders presented in this paper. In Section 2.1 we define the α, [a, b]-convex
decreasing functions and study their properties. In Section 2.2 we introduce the α, [a, b]-convex
decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders. In Section 2.3 we compare the α, [a, b]-
convex decreasing stochastic order to other stochastic orders. In Section 2.4 we present a sufficient
condition for domination in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic orders, which is simple to
check for α = 1, 2, . . .. In Section 2.5 we define the semi-variance stochastic order and discuss its
connection to the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order. We provide a complete character-
ization of the semi-variance stochastic order in terms of 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions. In
Section 3 we study the applications discussed above. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. The
Appendix contains all the proofs.
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1.1 Related literature
There is extensive literature on stochastic orders and their applications (for a survey see Mu¨ller and
Stoyan (2002) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)). The stochastic orders we study in this paper
are integral stochastic orders (Mu¨ller, 1997). Integral stochastic orders F are binary relations over
the set of random variables that are defined by a set of functions F in the following way: for two
random variables X and Y we have Y F X if and only if E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] for every u ∈ F and
the expectations exist. Many important stochastic orders are integral stochastic orders. SOSD
corresponds to the stochastic order F where F is the set of all concave and increasing functions.
The integral stochastic orders we present in this paper are related to stochastic orders that
weaken SOSD by restricting the set of utility functions under consideration. Third order stochastic
dominance (Whitmore, 1970) requires that the functions have a positive third derivative. Higher
stochastic orders (see Ekern (1980), Denuit et al. (1998), and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006))
restrict the sign of the functions’ higher derivatives (see also the Laplace transform stochastic order
in Brockett and Golden (1987)). Leshno and Levy (2002), Tsetlin et al. (2015), and Mu¨ller et al.
(2016) restrict the values of the functions’ derivatives. Vickson (1977) and Post et al. (2014) add
the assumption that the functions are in the decreasing absolute risk aversion class. Post (2016)
requires additional curvature conditions on the functions’ higher derivatives.
The above stochastic orders are significantly different from the stochastic orders we introduce
in this paper. All these stochastic orders impose a ranking over expectations, while the stochastic
orders presented in this paper do not impose a ranking over expectations. Other known stochastic
orders that do not impose a ranking over expectations are introduced in Fishburn (1976) and in
Meyer (1977a). Meyer (1977a) imposes a lower and an upper bound on the Arrow-Pratt absolute
risk-aversion measure (see more details on this stochastic order in Section 2.3). Fishburn (1976,
1980b) studies a stochastic order that is based on lower partial moments. The main disadvantage
of these stochastic orders is that the maximal generator of these stochastic orders is not known
(see more details in Sections 2.3 and 2.5).
2 The α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order
In this section we introduce and study the family of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave
increasing stochastic orders. In Section 2.1 we define and discuss the set of α, [a, b]-convex decreas-
ing functions. In Section 2.2 we define the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order and provide a
few examples. In Section 2.3 we introduce an integral condition that guarantees that a distribution
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F dominates a distribution G in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order.
2.1 The set of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions
In this section we introduce the concept of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions and provide some
properties of these functions. The set of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions is a subset of the set of
convex functions. We will use the set of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions in order to introduce
a novel family of integral stochastic orders in the next section.
We first introduce the set of α-convex functions.
Definition 1 Let α ≥ 1. We say that u : R→ R+ is α-convex, if u 1α is a convex function.
Notice that an α-convex function is restricted to being non-negative. In addition, it is easy to see
that if u is an α-convex function, then u is a convex function so the set of α-convex functions is a
subset of the set of convex functions (see Proposition 1).
If u is α-convex and twice differentiable, then u is α-convex if and only if (u(x)
1
α )′′ ≥ 0. Thus,
a twice differentiable function u : R→ R+ is α-convex if and only if
u(x)u′′(x) ≥ u′(x)2α− 1
α
for every x.
The space of α-convex functions has been studied in the field of convex geometry (see Lova´sz
and Simonovits (1993) and Fradelizi and Gue´don (2004)).2 The main idea behind the concept of
α-convexity is to parameterize the degree of convexity of a function. To see this, notice that when
α = 1 the set of 1-convex functions is the same as the set of convex functions, whereas as α→∞,
the set of α-convex functions approaches the set of log-convex functions.
In the context of stochastic orders, one disadvantage of the set of α-convex functions is that
this set does not include the negative constant functions. This fact implies that the maximal
generator of the stochastic order generated by the set of α-convex functions might not be equal to
the set of α-convex functions (see Section 2.3 for more details). In Section 2.3 we show that the
stochastic order generated by the set of α-convex functions is essentially equivalent to the second
order stochastic dominance.
We now introduce two sets of functions that generate the family of stochastic orders that we
study in this paper. Importantly, the sets Dα,[a,b] and Iα,[a,b] are convex, closed and contain all
2The α-convex functions are also used in Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) and Jensen (2017) to derive compara-
tive statics results in consumption-savings problems.
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the constant functions (see Proposition 1). We will discuss the importance of these properties in
Section 2.3.
Let B[a,b] be the set of bounded and measurable functions from [a, b] to R.3
Definition 2 Fix α ≥ 1 and [a, b] ⊆ R. We define the following subsets of B[a,b]:
Dα,[a,b] = {u ∈ B[a,b] | u is decreasing, gu(x) = u(x)− u(b) is α-convex} (1)
Iα,[a,b] = {u ∈ B[a,b] | u is increasing, gu(x) = u(b)− u(x) is α-convex} (2)
We say that u is a α, [a, b]-convex decreasing function if u ∈ Dα,[a,b] and that u is a α, [a, b]-concave
increasing function if u ∈ Iα,[a,b].
Note that Dα,[a,b] = −Iα,[a,b]. That is, u ∈ Dα,[a,b] if and only if −u ∈ Iα,[a,b].
The following Proposition provides some properties of [a, b]-convex decreasing and [a, b]-concave
increasing functions that will be used in the next sections.
Proposition 1 The following properties hold:
1. Dα,[a,b] and Iα,[a,b] are convex cones and are closed in the pointwise topology.
2. Let β > α, then Dβ,[a,b] ⊆ Dα,[a,b]. (Similarly, Iβ,[a,b] ⊆ Iα,[a,b].) In particular, if u ∈ Dα,[a,b],
then u is convex for all α > 1.
3. If u ∈ Dα,[a,b] then for every c ∈ R, the function gc(x) := u(x+ c) is in Dα[a+c,b+c]. (Similarly,
if u ∈ Iα,[a,b] then for every c ∈ R, the function gc(x) := u(x+ c) is in Iα[a+c,b+c].)
4. Consider u ∈ Dα,[a,b], twice differentiable with a continuous second derivative on [a, b].4 Then,
u′(b) = 0.
5. For α > 1, the sets Dα,[a,b] and Iα,[a,b] do not contain linear functions that are not constants.
Moreover, u ∈ Dα,[a,b] ∩ Iα,[a,b] if and only if u is a constant function.
3For the rest of the paper we say that a function u is decreasing if it is weakly decreasing, i.e., x < y implies
u(x) ≥ u(y). We say that u is increasing if −u is decreasing.
4The derivatives at the extreme points a, b are defined by taking the left-side and right-side limits, respectively
(see Definition 5.1 Rudin (1964)).
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2.2 The family of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic orders
In this section we introduce the family of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing
stochastic orders.
The family of α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders generalizes second order stochastic
dominance (SOSD), which corresponds to the 1, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order. The
idea of the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders is that the inequality E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)]
is required to hold only for a subset of the concave and increasing functions (and not for all of
them) in order to determine that a random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the
α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order. The inequality E[u(Y )] ≥ E[u(X)] is required to hold
for all the functions that belong to the set Iα,[a,b].
Definition 3 Fix α ≥ 1 and a < b. Let F and G be two cumulative distribution functions on
[a, b].5
1. We say that F dominates G in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order, denoted by
F α,[a,b]−D G, if for every u ∈ Dα,[a,b] we have∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x).
2. We say that F dominates G in the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order, denoted by
F α,[a,b]−I G, if for every u ∈ Iα,[a,b] we have∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x).
For two random variables X and Y with distribution functions F and G, respectively, we write
X α,[a,b]−D Y if and only if F α,[a,b]−D G, and X α,[a,b]−I Y if and only if F α,[a,b]−I G.
The α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders introduced in
this paper differ significantly from other popular stochastic orders studied in the previous literature.
The reason for the difference is that the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order rules out linear
functions: a linear function is α, [a, b]-concave increasing if and only if α = 1 (see Proposition
1). For α = 1, the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order is the same as SOSD. However, for
5In the rest of the paper, all functions are assumed to be integrable.
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α > 1, the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order is weaker than SOSD in the sense that if X
dominates Y in the SOSD, then X dominates Y in the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order
but the converse is not true. The α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order does not necessarily
imply a ranking over the expected value of the distributions: F can dominate G in the α, [a, b]-
concave increasing stochastic order and still have a lower expected value (see the examples below).
This key feature is critical in the applications that we study in Section 3. It allows us to derive
novel comparative statics results that are not possible using other stochastic orders.
When α increases there are fewer decision makers that need to prefer Y to X in order to
conclude that Y dominates X in the α, [a, b]-concave stochastic order. That is, for α2 > α1 we
have Iα2,[a,b] ⊂ Iα1,[a,b] (see Proposition 1). Informally, the decision makers u ∈ Iα1,[a,b]\Iα2,[a,b]
that are excluded from the set Iα1,[a,b] when using the α2, [a, b]-concave stochastic order instead of
using the α1, [a, b]-concave stochastic order are the decision makers that are the closest to being
risk neutral in the set Iα1,[a,b]. In other words, the decision makers u ∈ Iα1,[a,b]\Iα2,[a,b] have the
least concave function in the set Iα1,[a,b] where the degree of concavity is measured by the elasticity
of the marginal utility function with respect to the utility function. To see this, note that for a
twice continuously differentiable function u, we have u ∈ Iα,[a,b] if and only if
∂ ln(u′(x))
∂ ln(u(b)− u(x)) =
(u(b)− u(x))u′′(x)
(u′(x))2
≥ α− 1
α
for all x ∈ (a, b). That is, the elasticity of the marginal utility function with respect to the utility
function is bounded below by (α − 1)/α.6 Thus, when α is higher, the effect of a change in the
utility function on the marginal utility function is bounded below by a higher number.
The following examples show that the family of α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave
increasing stochastic orders allows us to compare lotteries that are not comparable by other pop-
ular stochastic orders. In particular, the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing
stochastic orders can compare two lotteries, where one lottery has a higher expected value and
is also riskier than the other lottery. In Example 1 we show that Y α,[a,b]−I X for the random
variables in Figure 1 (see Section 1). We provide two more examples of random variables X and
Y where X has a higher expected value and is riskier than Y , and Y dominates X in the α, [a, b]-
concave stochastic order. The second example involves compound lotteries and the third example
involves a uniform distribution.
6From a decision theory point of view, we can normalize u(b) = 0 without changing the preferences of the deci-
sion maker. Thus, under the normalization u(b) = 0, the elasticity of the marginal utility function with respect to
the function u(b)− u(x) is the same as its elasticity with respect to the function −u(x).
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Example 1 Consider two lotteries X and Y . Lottery X yields a dollars with probability λα and b
dollars with probability 1− λα where b > a and α ≥ 1. Lottery Y yields λa+ (1− λ) b dollars with
probability 1. Then Y α,[a,b]−I X.
Let u ∈ Iα,[a,b], 0 < λ < 1 and α ≥ 1. The α-convexity of u (b)− u (x) implies
[u (b)− u (λa+ (1− λ) b)] 1α ≤ λ [u (b)− u (a)] 1α + (1− λ) [u (b)− u (b)] 1α
⇔ u (b)− u (λa+ (1− λ) b) ≤ λαu (b)− λαu (a)
⇔ λαu (a) + (1− λα)u (b) ≤ u (λa+ (1− λ) b)
⇔
∫ b
a
u (x) dG(x) ≤
∫ b
a
u (x) dF (x)
where F is the distribution function of Y and G is the distribution function of X. We conclude
that Y α,[a,b]−I X.7
Example 2 (Compound lotteries). Consider two lotteries Y and X. Lottery Y yields xi :=
λia + (1− λi) b with probability 0 < pi < 1, i = 1, . . . , n where 0 < λ1 < . . . < λn < 1. Lottery X
yields a with probability
∑
i piλ
α
i and b with probability 1−
∑
i piλ
α
i . We show that Y α,[a,b]−I X.
Let u ∈ Iα,[a,b], 0 < λ < 1 and α ≥ 1. From Example 1 we have
u (xi) ≥ λαi u(a) + (1− λαi )u(b)
for all 0 < λ < 1. Multiplying each side of the last inequality by pi for i = 1, . . . , n and summing
the inequalities yield
n∑
i=1
piu (xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
(piλ
α
i u(a) + piu(b)− piλai u (b))
⇔
n∑
i=1
piu (xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
piλ
α
i u (a) +
(
1−
n∑
i=1
piλ
α
i
)
u (b)
⇔
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u (x) dG(x)
where F is the distribution function of Y and G is the distribution function of X. We conclude
that Y α,[a,b]−I X.
7Note that Example 1 implies that when α tends to infinity we have u(b) ≤ u(λa + (1 − λ)b. Hence, u is a
constant function.
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Example 3 (Uniform distribution). Consider two lotteries Y and X. Lottery X yields a dollars
with probability 1
α+1
and b dollars with probability α
α+1
where b > a and α ≥ 1. Lottery Y is
uniformly distributed on [a, b]. We claim that Y α,[a,b]−I X.
From Example 1, for any u ∈ Iα,[a,b] and α ≥ 1 we have
u (λa+ (1− λ) b) ≥ λαu(a) + (1− λα)u(b)
for all 0 < λ < 1. Integrating both sides yields∫ 1
0
u (λa+ (1− λ) b) dλ ≥ u(a)
∫ 1
0
λαdλ+ u (b)
∫ 1
0
(1− λα) dλ
⇔ 1
b− a
∫ b
a
u(x)dx ≥ 1
α + 1
u(a) +
α
a+ 1
u(b)
⇔
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u (x) dG(x)
where F is the distribution function of Y and G is the distribution function of X. We conclude
that Y α,[a,b]−I X.
For general distribution functions F and G it is not trivial to check whether F dominates G
in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing or α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders. In Section 2.4 we
provide a sufficient condition which guarantees that F dominates G in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing
stochastic order in the case that α is an integer.
We now prove some properties of the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing
stochastic orders.
Proposition 2 The following properties hold:
1. F α,[a,b]−D G if and only if G α,[a,b]−I F .
2. Let β > α, if F α,[a,b]−D G then F β,[a,b]−D G. In particular if F 1,[a,b]−D G, then
F α,[a,b]−D G. Similarly, if F α,[a,b]−I G then F β,[a,b]−I G. In particular, F 1,[a,b]−I G,
implies F α,[a,b]−I G. That is, the α, [a, b]-concave order is weaker than the second order
stochastic dominance for every α > 1.
3. Suppose that X α,[a,b]−D Y . Then X + c α,[a+c,b+c]−D Y + c for every c ∈ R. Similarly,
X α,[a,b]−I Y implies X + c α,[a+c,b+c]−I Y + c for every c ∈ R.
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4. Suppose that F and G are distributions on [a, b]. Then for every b′ ≥ b we have
F α,[a,b′]−D G =⇒ F α,[a,b]−D G
F α,[a,b′]−I G =⇒ F α,[a,b]−I G.
2.3 The maximal generator and other stochastic orders
In this section we discuss the maximal generator of an integral stochastic order and discuss other
stochastic orders that do not impose a ranking over the expectations of the random variables in
consideration. We now define the maximal generator of an integral stochastic order.
Define F F G if ∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x)
for all u ∈ F where F ⊆ B[a,b]. The stochastic order F is called an integral stochastic order.
The maximal generator RF of the integral stochastic order F is the set of all functions u with
the property that F F G implies∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x).
Mu¨ller (1997) studies the properties of the maximal generator. In our context, Muller’s results
imply that the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 3 (Corollary 3.8 in Mu¨ller (1997)). Suppose that F is a convex cone containing the
constant functions and is closed under pointwise convergence. Then RF = F.
From a decision theory point view, when using a stochastic order to determine whether a
random variable is better or riskier than another random variable, it is important to characterize
the maximal generator. If the maximal generator is not known, it is not clear what utility functions
are under consideration when deciding if a random variable is better or riskier than another random
variable.
From Proposition 1, we have that Dα,[a,b] is a convex cone that is closed in the topology of
pointwise convergence. Also, the set Dα,[a,b] contains all the constant functions. Hence, from
Proposition 3 we conclude that the maximal generator of the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic
order α,[a,b]−D is the set Dα,[a,b]. Similarly, the maximal generator of the α, [a, b]-concave increasing
stochastic order α,[a,b]−D is the set Iα,[a,b].
13
We now discuss one known stochastic order that does not impose a ranking over expectations:
SOSD with respect to a function. This stochastic order was studied in Meyer (1977b). Let k :
[a, b]→ R be a strictly increasing function. Meyer shows that∫ c
a
(F (x)−G(x)) dk(x)
for all c ∈ [a, b] if and only if ∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ b
a
u (x) dG(x) for all functions u : [a, b] → R such
that
−u
′′
u′
≥ −k
′′
k′
.
Although SOSD with respect to a function is easy to characterize, its downside is that the
maximal generator of this stochastic order is unknown. For some functions k the set of functions
that satisfy −u′′
u′ ≥ −k
′′
k′ does not include the constant functions. This can significantly affect the
maximal generator, as the following example shows.
We now show that a stochastic order that is based on the α-convex and decreasing functions
is not a useful stochastic order. The reason is that the maximal generator of this stochastic order
includes all the convex, positive, differentiable and decreasing functions (see Proposition 4 below).
Definition 4 Consider two distributions F and G on [a, b]. We say that F dominates G in the
α-convex stochastic order, denoted by F α−DCX G, if for every decreasing and α-convex function
u : [a, b]→ R+, we have ∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) .
Notice that the functions under consideration in this order have a constraint over the range: every
function u has to be non-negative.
Proposition 4 Let α > 1. Then F α−DCX G implies that for every convex and decreasing
function u : [a, b]→ R+ such that u′(a) exists and is finite we have∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x).
The above proposition shows that the α-convex stochastic order is essentially the same as the
well studied convex and decreasing stochastic order. Note that the set of decreasing α-convex
functions is a closed convex cone that is a strict subset of the set of decreasing convex functions.
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This, nevertheless, is not a contradiction of Proposition 3, because negative constant functions
do not belong to the set of α-convex functions. This fact also explains the proof of Proposition
3. Informally, for every convex function u a constant c > 0 exists such that u + c is essentially
α-convex.
The above discussion is the reason that we introduce the sets of functions Dα,[a,b] and Iα,[a,b]
which include all the constant functions. One limitation of these sets is that if u ∈ Dα,[a,b] and
u is twice differentiable, then u′(b) = 0 (see Proposition 1). That is, the decision makers under
consideration when comparing two random variables have a 0 marginal utility at the point b. One
way to overcome this is to choose a large b′ such that it is plausible to assume that u′(b′) = 0. Then,
if F and G are distributions on [a, b], we can use the fact that F α,[a,b′]−D G =⇒ F α,[a,b]−D G
(see Proposition 2) to conclude that F α,[a,b]−D G.
2.4 A sufficient condition for domination in the α, [a, b]-convex decreas-
ing stochastic order
In this section we present a simple integral condition to check whether a distribution F dominates
a distribution G in the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order.
We introduce a new stochastic order n,[a,b]−S for n ∈ N, which we call the n, [a, b]-sufficient
stochastic order.
Definition 5 Consider two distributions F and G over [a, b]. We say that F dominates G in
the n, [a, b]-sufficient stochastic order, and write F n,[a,b]−S G for n ∈ N, if and only if for all
c = (c1, ..., cn) ∈ [a, b]n,∫ b
a
n∏
i=1
max{ci − x, 0}dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
n∏
i=1
max{ci − x, 0}dG(x) .
Note that F dominates G in the 1, [a, b]-sufficient stochastic order if and only if the following
condition holds:
for every c ∈ [a, b],
∫ b
a
max{c− x, 0}dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
max{c− x, 0}dG(x) .
That is, F dominates G in the 1, [a, b]-sufficient stochastic order if the integral of every piecewise
linear function max{c − x, 0} under the distribution function F is higher than under the distri-
bution function G. It is well known that this is equivalent to the condition that
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
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∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) for every convex and decreasing function u (for example, see Theorem 1.5.7. in Mu¨ller
and Stoyan (2002)).
That is, we have
F 1,[a,b]−D G ⇐⇒ for every c ∈ [a, b],
∫ b
a
max{c− x, 0}dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
max{c− x, 0}dG(x)
⇐⇒ for every c ∈ [a, b],
∫ c
a
F (x)dx ≥
∫ c
a
G(x)dx .
The main result of this section is an extension of the result above. We show that if F dominates
G in the n, [a, b]-sufficient stochastic order, then F dominates G in the n, [a, b]-convex decreasing
stochastic order for all n ∈ N.
Proposition 5 Consider two distributions F and G over [a, b]. If F dominates G in the n, [a, b]-
sufficient stochastic order, then F dominates G in the n, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order.
That is, for every n ∈ N if F n,[a,b]−S G then F n,[a,b]−D G.
Note that for n > 1 the converse of Proposition 5 does not hold. That is, F n,[a,b]−D G
does not imply F n,[a,b]−S G. For example, for n = 2 it can be checked that the function
max{c1 − x, 0}max{c2 − x, 0} is not a 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing function for c2 6= c1. Since the
maximal generator of the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order is the set of 2, [a, b]-convex
decreasing functions (see Section 2.3) we conclude that F 2,[a,b]−D G does not imply F 2,[a,b]−S G.
In Section 2.5 we fully characterize the stochastic order that is generated by the 2, [a, b]-convex
decreasing functions with a negative third derivative.
To show the usefulness of the n, [a, b]-sufficient stochastic order, we study the case of n = 2.
We provide a sufficient condition that ensures that F dominates G in the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing
stochastic order by applying Proposition 5. Checking this condition is as straightforward as evalu-
ating simple integrals. Similar conditions are used to determine if F dominates G in other popular
stochastic orders such as the second order stochastic dominance and the third order stochastic
dominance.
Proposition 6 Consider two distributions F and G over [a, b]. We have that F 2,[a,b]−S G if and
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only if for all c ∈ [a, b] the following two inequalities hold:
(b− c)
[ ∫ c
a
F (x)dx−
∫ c
a
G(x)dx
]
+ 2
∫ c
a
(∫ x
a
F (z)dz −
∫ x
a
G(z)dz
)
dx ≥ 0 (3)∫ c
a
(∫ x
a
F (z)dz −
∫ x
a
G(z)dz
)
dx ≥ 0 . (4)
From Proposition 6 we can see that the sufficient condition for F to dominate G in the 2, [a, b]-
convex decreasing stochastic order is related to the second moment and the third moment of the
distributions. Here we relate
∫ c
a
F (z)dz to the second moment and
∫ c
a
∫ x
a
F (z)dzdx to the third
moment. Thus, the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order trades off the different effects of
riskiness in a non-linear way. Interestingly, the second condition of Proposition 6 inherently relates
to third order stochastic dominance, which corresponds to that condition and to the condition
EG[X] ≥ EF [X]. In contrast, in the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order we do not impose
any constraint on expectations, but there is a constraint on the second moment. In Section 2.5 we
further study the second condition of Proposition 6.
In some cases, the 2-sufficient stochastic order provides a necessary and sufficient integral condi-
tion to conclude that F 2,[a,b]−D G. If condition (4) implies condition (3) then condition (4) holds
if and only if F 2,[a,b]−D G. To see this, note that the function max{c− x, 0}2 is a 2, [a, b]-convex
decreasing function and that∫ b
a
max{c− x, 0}2dF (x) = 2
∫ c
a
(∫ x
a
F (z)dz
)
dx
(see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). Thus, if F 2,[a,b]−D G holds, then condition (4) holds. On the
other hand, if condition (4) implies condition (3), then from Proposition 6 we have F 2,[a,b]−D G.
We summarize this result in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Let F and G be two distributions over [a, b]. Suppose that if condition (4) holds then
condition (3) also holds. Then condition (4) holds if and only if F 2,[a,b]−D G.
In Section 2.5 we show that condition (4) holds if and only if
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) for
every u ∈ Dα,[a,b] that is thrice differentiable and has a negative third derivative.
To close this section, using the 2, [a, b]-sufficient stochastic order, we provide two examples
in which a random variable dominates another random variable in the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing
stochastic order. These examples demonstrate that checking domination in the 2, [a, b]-convex
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decreasing stochastic order is a matter of algebraic computations, similar to checking domination
in first, second and third order stochastic dominance. We will use these examples in Section 3.
In the first example we consider two uniform random variables. Suppose that F ∼ U [a1, b1]
and G ∼ U [a2, b2] where U [a, b] is the continuous uniform random variable on [a, b].
Assumption 1 We assume that a1 < a2 < b2 < b1 and
a1+b1
2
> a2+b2
2
.
If Assumption 1 does not hold then the expected value of G is higher or equal to the expected
value of F , q so we clearly have F 1,[a1,b1]−D G. In other words, G dominates F in the second
order stochastic dominance.
The following Lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition on the parameters (a1, b1, a2, b2)
so that F 2,[a1,b1]−D G.
Lemma 1 Suppose that F ∼ U [a1, b1] and G ∼ U [a2, b2] and that Assumption 1 holds. Then
F 2,[a1,b1]−D G if and only if
b1 ≤ 3(a2 + b2)− 2a1 +
√
a22 + 10a2b2 + b
2
2 − 12a1(a2 + b2 − a1)
4
. (5)
Lemma 1 can be used to prove non-trivial inequalities that involve convex functions. The
Lemma implies that if inequality (5) holds, then for every 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing function u we
have ∫ b1
a1
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b2
a2
u(x)dG(x).
We leverage this fact to prove Hermite-Hadamard inequalities in Section 3.4.
In the second example we consider two-point distributions, i.e., the support of the distributions
has two elements. We will use this example to study self-protection problems (see Section 3.2).
Lemma 2 Suppose that X yields x1 with probability p and x3 with probability 1 − p. Y yields x2
with probability q and x4 with probability 1− q.
Suppose that the expected value of X is higher than the expected value of Y , i.e.,
px1 + (1− p)x3 ≥ qx2 + (1− q)x4. (6)
Then X 2,[x1,x4]−D Y if and only if
p(x4 − x1)2 + (1− p)(x4 − x3)2 ≥ q(x4 − x2)2. (7)
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2.5 The semi-variance stochastic order
In this section we study the semi-variance stochastic order. Some properties of the semi-variance
stochastic order were provided in Fishburn (1976, 1980a). We show that the semi-variance stochas-
tic order is closely related to the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order. In particular, we
characterize the semi-variance stochastic order and show that its maximal generator includes the
2, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions with a negative third derivative. We now define the semi-
variance stochastic order.
Definition 6 Consider two distributions F and G over [a, b]. We say that F dominates G in the
semi-variance stochastic order and write F [a,b]−SV F G, if and only if for all c ∈ [a, b], we have∫ b
a
max{c− x, 0}2dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
max{c− x, 0}2dG(x) . (8)
That is, F [a,b]−SV F G if for every semi-variance function on [a, b], uc(x) = max{c − x, 0}2,
c ∈ [a, b], we have ∫ b
a
uc(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
uc(x)dG(x).
To the best of our knowledge, the maximal generator (see Section 2.3) of the semi-variance
stochastic order is unknown. From the facts that every semi-variance function on [a, b] is a 2, [a, b]-
convex decreasing function and that the set of 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions is a closed convex
cone that contains the constant functions (see Proposition 1), we conclude from Proposition 3 that
the maximal generator of the semi-variance stochastic order is included in the set of 2, [a, b]-convex
decreasing functions. On the other hand, consider a function f that is thrice differentiable with
f ′′(x) ≥ 0 and f ′′′(x) ≤ 0. That is, the first derivative of f is concave and increasing. Note that
the first derivative of a semi-variance function is the piecewise linear function −max{c− x, 0} for
some c ∈ [a, b]. It is well known that every concave and increasing function can be approximated
by the sum of piecewise linear functions, and hence it is intuitive that f belongs to the maximal
generator of the semi-variance stochastic order.
In Theorem 1 we show that F [a,b]−SV F G if and only if
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) for
every function u : [a, b] → R that is thrice differentiable, with u ∈ D2,[a,b] and u′′′(x) ≤ 0 for
every x ∈ [a, b], i.e., every u ∈ F1 (see the definition below). Since D2,[a,b] is a convex cone that
contains the constant functions, it is immediate that F1 is a convex cone that contains the constant
functions. Thus, from Proposition 3 we conclude that the closure in the pointwise topology of F1
is the maximal generator of the semi-variance stochastic order.
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Definition 7 We define the set F1 to be the set of all functions u : [a, b] → R that are thrice
differentiable, with u ∈ D2,[a,b] and u′′′(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ [a, b].
Theorem 1 Consider two distributions F and G over [a, b]. Then F [a,b]−SV F G if and only if∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x)
for every function u ∈ F1.
From Theorem 1 we have F [a,b]−SV F G if and only if
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) ≥ ∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) for every
function u that is a 2, [a, b]-concave increasing function and has a positive third derivative. That
is, F [a,b]−SV F G if and only if every risk-averse decision maker with a VNM utility function u
that has a positive third derivative, and for which the square root of u(b)−u(x) is concave, prefers
F over G.8 The property of having a positive third derivative implies that the decision maker
prefers positive skewness over negative skewness. From a theoretical perspective this property is
appealing, as it implies aversion to downside risk (see Menezes et al. (1980) and Chiu (2005)). The
semi-variance stochastic order [a,b]−SV F is also appealing from a computational perspective (see
Post and Kopa (2016)).
It is interesting to note that the set of 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing functions with a negative
third derivative has a simple characterization. This set equals the set of convex and decreasing
functions with a negative third derivative that satisfy u′(b) = 0. Thus, it is easy to find 2, [a, b]-
convex decreasing functions with a negative third derivative. Suppose that u is a convex, thrice
differentiable function with a negative third derivative. Then u˜(x) = u(x) − xu′(b) is convex and
decreasing, u˜′(b) = 0, and u˜′′′ ≤ 0, and hence, u is a 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing function.
Proposition 7 We define the set F2 as the set of functions u : [a, b]→ R that are thrice differen-
tiable, convex, decreasing, u′(b) = 0, and u′′′(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ [a, b].
We have F1 = F2.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, one limitation of the semi-variance stochastic order and, more
generally, of the α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders, is that the decision makers under
consideration when comparing two random variables have a 0 marginal utility at the point b. One
8As we explain in Section 2.2, because we can normalize u(b) = 0, the condition that the square root of u(b) −
u(x) is concave relates to the elasticity of the marginal utility function with respect to the utility function. This
elasticity can be interpreted as a measure of convexity.
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possible solution to this limitation is to choose a large b′ and it is offered in Section 2.3. We note
that if the distributions under consideration have unbounded supports, and hence, inequality (8)
holds for all c ∈ [a,∞), then the expected values of the random variables are ranked (see Fishburn
(1980b)). Thus, in the case of unbounded supports, the semi-variance stochastic order is equivalent
to third order stochastic dominance.
3 Applications
In this section, we discuss four applications in which we use the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and
α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic orders: a consumption-savings problem with an uncertain
future income, self-protection problems, a Diamond-type search model with one-sided incomplete
information, and Hermite-Hadamard inequalities.
3.1 Precautionary saving when the future labor income is riskier and
has a higher expected value
Researchers have devoted a great deal of attention to analyzing the impact of future income un-
certainty, in particular, on savings decisions.9 In their seminal papers, Leland (1968) and Sandmo
(1970) show that in a two-period consumption-savings problem for a prudent agent (i.e., an agent
whose marginal utility is convex), if the labor income risk increases in the sense of second order
stochastic dominance, then the agent’s savings increase. The agent’s savings are also affected by
the expected present value of future labor income: an increase in the expected present value de-
creases current savings. Up to now, no stochastic order has been provided that can be used to
derive comparative statics results for the case when both the present value and the risk of future
income increase. For instance, consider the two labor income distributions described in Figure 2.
Under which distribution should we expect to observe higher savings? For c ≥ 15, Y˜ is riskier
than X˜, in the sense of SOSD. Thus, in the expected utility framework, savings are higher under Y˜
than under X˜ (see Sandmo (1970)). In the case that c < 15, it is easy to see that X˜ and Y˜ cannot
be compared by SOSD. In this case, there is a trade-off between the agent’s future income risk
9For recent results on precautionary saving, see Crainich et al. (2013), Nocetti (2015), Light (2018), and Bom-
mier and Grand (2018). We note that our comparative statics results are significantly different from the results in
the papers above, because we consider the case that both the present value and the risk of future income increase.
In the papers mentioned above, stochastic orders that impose a ranking over expectations such as the second or-
der stochastic dominance or higher order stochastic dominance are used.
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Figure 2: Future labor income
versus the agent’s future income present value. In this section we use the family of α, [a, b]-convex
decreasing stochastic orders to derive comparative statics results in the presence of this trade-off.
We now describe the two-period consumption-savings problem that we study.
An agent decides how much to save and how much to consume while his next period’s income
is uncertain. If the agent has an initial wealth of x and he decides to save 0 ≤ s ≤ x, then the first
period’s utility is given by u(x − s) and the second period’s utility is given by u(Rs + y) where
y is the next period’s income, R is the rate of return, and u describes the agent’s utility from
consumption. The agent chooses a savings level to maximize his expected utility:
h(s, F ) := u(x− s) +
∫ y
0
u(Rs+ y)dF (y)
where the distribution of the next period’s income y is given by F . The support of F is given by
[0, y]. We assume that the agent’s utility function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
continuously differentiable.
Let g(F ) = argmaxs∈C(x) h(s, F ) be the optimal savings under the distribution F where we
denote by C(x) := [0, x] the interval from which the agent may choose his level of savings when
his wealth is x.
Let I be the increasing stochastic order and CX be the convex stochastic order.10 Two
well known facts about the effect of the future income’s distribution on savings decisions are the
following:
Proposition 8 (i) If F I G then g(F ) ≥ g(G).
(ii) If F CX G and u′ is convex then g(F ) ≥ g(G).
10 Recall that F I G if and only if
∫
u(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ u(x)dG(x) for every increasing function u and F CX G
if and only if
∫
u(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ u(x)dG(x) for every convex function u.
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Part (i) of the last Proposition states that if the future income’s distribution is better in the sense
of first order stochastic dominance, then the current savings are lower. The additional consumption
follows from the permanent income motive, i.e., the agent wants to smooth consumption. Part (ii)
of the last Proposition states that when the future income’s distribution is riskier in the sense of
the convex stochastic order, then the current savings are higher. The additional savings are called
precautionary saving.
In the following Proposition we consider the case that the income’s distribution is better and
riskier. We show that when the agent’s marginal utility is a 2, [0, Rx+ y]-convex function then the
precautionary saving motive is stronger than the permanent income motive, i.e., F 2,[0,Rx+y]−S G
implies g(F ) ≥ g(G). The condition that u′ is a 2, [0, Rx+ y]-convex function guarantees that the
agent’s marginal utility is “very” convex (that is, the agent is “very” prudent), so that the agent
prefers to save more under the riskier income distribution even though it has a higher expected
value. This condition is not satisfied by the important class of constant relative risk aversion
functions. However, a closely related class of utility functions satisfies this condition. We show
that u′ is a 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing function for the utility function
u(x) =
x1−γ
1− γ +
γx2
2bγ+1
for γ ≥ 0, γ 6= 1 and u(x) = log(x) + x2/2b2 for γ = 1. Note that for a large b the utility function
defined above is close to a constant relative risk aversion utility function.
Proposition 9 (i) Suppose that u′ is a 2, [0, Rx + y]-convex function and that F 2,[0,Rx+y]−S G.
Then g(F ) ≥ g(G), i.e., the savings under F are greater than or equal to the savings under G.
(ii) Define u : [0, b]→ R by
u(x) =
x1−γ
1− γ +
γx2
2bγ+1
for γ ≥ 0, γ 6= 1 and u(x) = log(x) + x2/2b2 for γ = 1. Then u′ is a 2, [0, b]-convex decreasing
function for all b > 0 and all γ ≥ 0.
For a thrice differentiable utility function, the condition that u′ is a 2, [0, b]-convex decreasing
function is equivalent to the condition that (u′(x) − u′(b))u′′′(x)/(u′′(x))2 ≥ 0.5 for all x ∈ [a, b].
The last condition relates to the decision maker’s cautiousness which is used to study the demand
for options and the preferences for skewness (see Huang and Stapleton (2013)).
We state the result in Proposition 9 with respect to the sufficient stochastic order. Proposition 9
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holds also when the sufficient stochastic order is replaced by the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic
order or by the semi-variance stochastic order.
3.2 Self-protection problems
Self-protection is a costly action that reduces the probability for a loss (see Ehrlich and Becker
(1972)). Since the work of Ehrlich and Becker (1972), self-protection problems are widely studied
in the literature on decision making under uncertainty.11 Should a decision maker choose more or
less self-protection? One way to answer this question is based on stochastic orders. A risk-averse
decision maker can decide to prefer less self-protection if most risk-averse decision makers prefer less
self-protection. In this section we study a standard self-protection problem and provide a decision
rule to answer the question above based on the 2, [a, b]-concave increasing stochastic order. We
find conditions that imply that an agent prefers to decrease the level of self-protection even when
the increase in self-protection is profitable in expectation.
We study a simple self-protection problem (as in Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and Eeckhoudt and
Gollier (2005)) where there are two possible outcomes: a loss of fixed size or no loss at all. We now
provide the formal details.
There are two lotteries X and Y . Lottery X yields w − L − e2 with probability p and w − e2
with probability 1− p. Lottery Y yields w−L− e1 with probability q and w− e1 with probability
1− q. w is the wealth that the decision maker has, L is the fixed loss, p and q are the probabilities
of loss that depend on the level of expenditure on self-protection ei for i = 1, 2. We assume that
e2 > e1 and q > p. That is, if the decision maker chooses a higher expenditure on self protection,
then the probability of a loss decreases. We also assume that w − e2 > w − L − e1. If the last
inequality does not hold, every rational decision maker would clearly prefer X to Y . The following
Proposition follows immediately from Lemma 2 and part (i) of Proposition 2.
Proposition 10 Suppose that the expected value of X is higher than the expected value of Y , i.e.,
−pL− e2 ≥ −qL− e1. Then
p(e2 − e1 + L)2 + (1− p)(e2 − e1)2 ≥ qL2 (9)
if and only if Y 2,[w−L−e2,w−e1]−I X, i.e., Y dominates X in the 2, [w − L − e2, w − e1]-concave
increasing stochastic order.
11For example, see Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985), Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005), Meyer and Meyer (2011), De-
nuit et al. (2016), and Liu and Meyer (2017).
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The interpretation of inequality (9) is straightforward. The random variable Y˜ that yields L
with probability q and 0 with probability 1−q represents the future loss if the agent does not spend
more on self-protection. The random variable X˜ that yields e2 − e1 − L with probability p and
e2− e1 with probability 1− p represents the future loss if the agent chooses to spend more on self-
protection (in this case the agent loses e2−e1 in any outcome). If the second moment of X˜ is higher
than the second moment of Y˜ then the decision maker should not spend more on self-protection
according to the decision rule that is based on the 2, [w−L− e2, w− e1]-concave stochastic order.
That is, if the increase in expenditure on self-protection increases the risk (second moment) of
future loss, then the decision maker does not increase the expenditure on self-protection even when
the increase the expenditure on self-protection increases the expected value of the decision maker’s
final wealth.
3.3 A Diamond-type search model with one-sided incomplete informa-
tion
In this section we a study a Diamond-type search model studied in Diamond (1982) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1990) to a one-sided incomplete information framework. Consider the case of two
agents that benefit from a match. We analyze the case where one player has better information
than the other. For instance, one player has been in the market for a long time and his type is
known, whereas the second player just entered the market, so his type is unknown. We show that
a shift (in the sense of the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order) in the uninformed player’s
beliefs about the informed player’s type leads to an increase in the highest equilibrium probability
of matching. We now describe the Bayesian game.
There are two players who exert efforts in order to find a match. Each player exerts a costly
effort ei ∈ E := [0, 1], in order to achieve a match. For each player, the value of a match is one.
The probability of matching is e1e2, given the efforts e1, e2. The cost of Player 1’s (the uninformed
player) effort is given by a strictly convex and strictly increasing function c1(e) that is known to
both players. The cost of Player 2’s effort is given by c2(e, θ) :=
ek+12
(k+1)(1−θ)l where θ ∈ [0, 1) is Player
2’s type which is not known to Player 1, and k, l > 0 are some parameters. Player 1’s beliefs about
the value of θ are given by a distribution F with support on [0, 1]. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(BNE) of the game is given by (e∗1, e
∗
2(θ)) where
e∗1 = argmax
e1∈E
∫ 1
0
e1e
∗
2(θ)dF (θ)− c1(e1)
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and
e∗2(θ) = argmax
e2∈E
e∗1e2 −
ek+12
(k + 1)(1− θ)l , for θ ∈ [0, 1).
Standard arguments show that this game is a supermodular game, and thus the highest and the
lowest equilibria exist (see Topkis (1979) and the Appendix for more details). Define m¯(F ) =
e¯∗1e¯
∗
2(θ) to be the highest equilibrium probability of matching. We show that a shift in Player 1’s
beliefs, in the sense of the α, [0, 1]-convex decreasing stochastic order, leads to an increase in the
highest equilibrium probability of matching.
Proposition 11 Fix α ≥ 1. Suppose that l ≥ αk. If F ′ α,[0,1]−D F then m¯(F ′) ≥ m¯(F ). That
is, the highest equilibrium probability of matching is increasing with respect to the α, [0, 1]-convex
decreasing stochastic order.
We note that Proposition 11 allows us to derive non-trivial comparative statics results. Assume
that the uninformed player’s beliefs change in the sense of the α, [0, 1]-convex decreasing stochastic
order, i.e., F ′ α,[0,1]−D F . F ′ might have a higher expected value than F , which means that
the uninformed player thinks that the informed player’s cost has a higher expected value. Thus,
the uninformed player should decrease his effort, since he is expecting that the informed player
will decrease his effort. On the other hand, F ′ is riskier than F and this induces the uninformed
player to increase his effort. Proposition 11 shows that ultimately, in equilibrium, the latter effect
is stronger. Thus, the efforts of both players increase and the equilibrium probability of matching
increases.
3.4 Hermite-Hadamard inequalities for 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing func-
tions
Convex functions are fundamental in proving many well-known inequalities. The convex stochastic
order is a powerful tool for proving inequalities that involve convex functions (see Rajba (2017) for
a survey). In this section we prove Hermite-Hadamard type inequalities for convex functions that
belong to the set D2,[a,b] using the 2, [a, b]-convex stochastic order. Hermite-Hadamard inequalities
are important in the literature on inequalities and have numerous applications in various fields of
mathematics (see Peajcariaac and Tong (1992) and Dragomir and Pearce (2003)).
Recall that the classical Hermite-Hadamard inequality states that for a convex function f :
[a, b]→ R we have
f
(
a+ b
2
)
≤ 1
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x)dx ≤ f (a) + f(b)
2
. (10)
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Inequality (10) is an easy consequence of the convex stochastic order. The left-hand-side of the
inequality states that the uniform random variable on [a, b] dominates the random variable that
yields an amount of (a + b)/2 with probability 1 in the sense of the convex stochastic order. The
right-hand-side of the inequality states that the uniform random variable on [a, b] is dominated
by the random variable that yields a and b with probability 1/2 each in the sense of the convex
stochastic order. Using Lemma 1 we show that the continuous uniform random variable on [a, b]
dominates the random variable that yields an amount of γa + (1 − γ)b with probability 1 in the
2, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic order, even for γ < 0.5. Thus, we obtain a novel inequality
for convex functions that belong to the set D2,[a,b].
Proposition 12 Suppose that f ∈ D2,[a,b] where a < b. Then
f (γb+ (1− γ) a) ≤ 1
b− a
∫ b
a
f (x) dx ≤ tf (a) + (1− t) f(b) (11)
for all t ≥ 1
3
and for all γ ≥ 2
3+
√
3
.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduce the α, [a, b]-convex decreasing and α, [a, b]-concave increasing stochas-
tic orders, a new family of stochastic orders that extends the second order stochastic dominance.
The α, [a, b]-convex decreasing stochastic orders are particularly useful for comparing two random
variables where one random variable has a higher expected value and is also riskier than the other
random variable. We provide sufficient conditions to ensure domination in the α, [a, b]-convex
decreasing stochastic order when α is a positive integer. We also characterize the semi-variance
stochastic order and show that this stochastic order is related to the 2, [a, b]-convex decreasing
stochastic order. We derive comparative statics results in applications from the economics and
operations research literature. We foresee additional beneficial applications of α, [a, b]-convex de-
creasing stochastic orders, especially for comparing lotteries that have different expected values
and different levels of risk.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Section 2.1
Proof of Proposition 1. The statements regarding the set Iα,[a,b] follows from proving the
statements regarding the set Dα,[a,b] and then using the fact that Dα,[a,b] = −Iα,[a,b]. Thus, we only
prove the results for the set Dα,[a,b].
1. First, notice that if Dα,[a,b] is a closed convex cone, then Iα,[a,b] = −Dα,[a,b] is a closed convex
cone.
Consider u, v ∈ Dα,[a,b] and λ > 0. Clearly, u+ λv is decreasing. Notice that,
(u+ λv)(x)− (u+ λ)(b) = u(x)− u(b) + λ(v(x)− v(b)) ,
hence, (u + λv)(x) − (u + λ)(b) can be written as the sum of two α-convex function. The
sum of α-convex function is α-convex (see the online Appendix of Jensen (2017)). Hence,
u+ λv ∈ Dα,[a,b], which shows that Dα,[a,b] is a convex cone.
To show that Dα,[a,b] is closed under pointwise convergence consider a sequence (un) in Dα,[a,b]
such that un → u (pointwise). Clearly, u is decreasing. The function u(x)− u(b) is the limit
of the α-convex functions un(x)− un(b), and hence, u(x)− u(b) is α-convex, (see the online
Appendix of Jensen (2017)). Thus, u ∈ Dα,[a,b].
2. Consider u ∈ Dβ,[a,b]. Then u is decreasing and f(x) := (u(x) − u(b))
1
β is convex. Because
β > α, the function g(x) := x
β
α is increasing and convex. Therefore, g(f(x)) is convex. We
conclude that, (u(x)− u(b)) 1α is convex. Thus, u ∈ Dα,[a,b].
3. Because u ∈ Dα,[a,b] the function gc is decreasing on [a+ c, b+ c]. Take x1, x2 ∈ [a+ c, b+ c]
and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since u(x)− u(b) is α-convex we have
(
u(λ(x1−c)+(1−λ)(x2−c))−u(b)
) 1
α
≤ λ
(
u(x1−c)−u(b)
) 1
α
+(1−λ)
(
u(x2−c)−u(b)
) 1
α
.
Since gc(λx1 +(1−λx2)) = u(λ(x1− c)+(1−λ)(x2− c)), gc(b+ c) = u(b), gc(x1) = u(x1− c),
and gc(x2) = u(x2− c), we conclude that gc(x)− gc(b+ c) is α-convex. Thus, gc ∈ Dα,[a+c,b+c].
4. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that u′(b) 6= 0. Because u′ is continuous, a δ > 0
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exists such that limx→b− u′(x)2 > δ. Notice that
lim
x→b−
(u(x)− (b))u′′(x) = lim
x→b−
(u(x)− u(b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
lim
x→b−
u′′(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u′′(b)
= 0 .
Thus,
lim
x→b−
(u(x)− u(b))u′′(x)
u′(x)2
=
limx→b−(u(x)− u(b))u′′(x)
limx→b− u′(x)2
= 0 .
Because u is twice differentiable with a continuous second derivative, a  > 0 exists such
that for x ∈ (b− , b), (u(x)−u(b))u′′(x)
u′(x)2 <
α−1
α
. Using the α-convex characterization for a twice
differentiable function, we conclude that u(x)− u(b) is not α-convex. Therefore, u /∈ Dα,[a,b]
which is a contradiction. We conclude that u′(b) = 0.
5. Let α > 1. Consider u to be a linear function that is decreasing and not a constant. Notice
that u(x)− u(b) is twice-differentiable, and that for every x ∈ [a, b] u′(x) < 0 and u′′(x) = 0.
We conclude that (u(x)−u(b))u
′′(x)
u′(x)2 = 0. Thus, u(x)− u(b) is not α-convex, i.e., u /∈ Dα,[a,b].
Suppose that u ∈ Dα,[a,b] ∩ Iα,[a,b], then u is convex, concave and measurable. Hence, u is a
linear function. From the argument above, we conclude that u must be a constant. Constant
functions are always in the set Dα,[a,b], Iα,[a,b]. Hence, if u ∈ Dα,[a,b]∩Iα,[a,b] then u is a constant
function.
A.2 Proofs of Section 2.2
Proof of Proposition 2.
1. We have u ∈ Dα,[a,b] if and only if −u ∈ Iα,[a,b]. Thus,
F α,[a,b]−D G ⇐⇒ EF [u] ≥ EG[u] ∀u ∈ Dα,[a,b]
⇐⇒ EF [u] ≤ EG[u] ∀u ∈ Iα,[a,b] ⇐⇒ G α,[a,b]−I F .
The following statements regarding the stochastic order α,[a,b]−I are trivially proved by showing
them on the stochastic order α,[a,b]−D and then using the fact that Dα,[a,b] = −Iα,[a,b]. Thus, we
only prove the results for the stochastic order α,[a,b]−D.
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2. Suppose that F α,[a,b]−D G and that u ∈ Dβ,[a,b]. Because β > α, Proposition 1 implies that
u ∈ Dα,[a,b]. Hence, EF [u] ≥ EG[u]. Given that u is an arbitrary function that belongs to the
set Dβ,[a,b], we conclude that F β,[a,b]−D G.
3. Consider X α,[a,b]−D Y and u ∈ Dα,[a+c,b+c]. Suppose that the distributions of X and Y are
F and G, respectively. From Proposition 1 we have that gc(x) := u(x+ c) belongs to the set
Dα,[a,b]. Hence,∫ b
a
gc(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
gc(x)dG(x) ⇐⇒
∫ b
a
u(x+ c)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x+ c)dG(x)
⇐⇒
∫ b+c
a+c
u(z)dF (z − c) ≥
∫ b+c
a+c
u(z)dG(z − c) .
The last equivalence comes from using the change of variables z = x + c. We conclude that
X + c α,[a+c,b+c]−D Y + c.
4. Let b′ > b. Assume that F α,[a,b′]−D G and u ∈ Dα,[a,b]. We extend u to the domain [a, b′] as
follows:
uˆ(x) =
u(x) if x ∈ [a, b]u(b) if x ∈ [b, b′] .
We assert that uˆ ∈ Dα,[a,b′]. Clearly, uˆ is decreasing, it remains to prove that uˆ(x) − uˆ(b′)
is α-convex. For this extent, we claim that for x1, x2 ∈ [a, b′] and λ ∈ [0, 1] the following
inequality holds:
(
uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
≤ λ
(
uˆ(x1)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
+ (1− λ)
(
uˆ(x2)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
. (12)
We prove this by separating our analysis in three cases:
– For x1, x2 ∈ [a, b], we have that uˆ(x1) = u(x1), uˆ(x2) = u(x2), uˆ(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) =
u(λx1 + (1− λ)x2), and uˆ(b′) = u(b). Thus, because u(x)− u(b) is α-convex inequality
(12) holds.
– For x1, x2 ∈ [b, b′], we have that uˆ(x1) = uˆ(b′), uˆ(x2) = uˆ(b′), uˆ(λx1 + (1−λ)x2) = uˆ(b′),
and therefore, inequality (12) holds.
– The last case is when x1 ∈ [a, b] and x2 ∈ (b, b′] (or analogously, when x1 ∈ (b, b′] and
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x2 ∈ [a, b]). Because x1 ∈ [a, b], from the first case we have that(
uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)b)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
≤ λ
(
uˆ(x1)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
+ (1− λ)
(
uˆ(b)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
.
Because uˆ is decreasing we have that uˆ(λx1+(1−λ)b)−uˆ(b′) ≥ uˆ(λx1+(1−λ)x2)−uˆ(b′).
We also have that uˆ(b) = uˆ(x2). Thus,(
uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
≤ λ
(
uˆ(x1)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
+ (1− λ)
(
uˆ(x2)− uˆ(b′)
) 1
α
.
Which proves our claim.
Because uˆ ∈ Dα,[a,b′] and F α,[a,b′]−D G, we have that
∫ b′
a
uˆ(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ b′
a
uˆ(x)dG(x). Since
F and G are distributions with support contained on [a, b], we have that
∫ b′
a
uˆ(x)dF (x) =∫ b
a
uˆ(x)dF (x) =
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) and
∫ b′
a
uˆ(x)dG(x) =
∫ b
a
uˆ(x)dG(x) =
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x). There-
fore, for any u ∈ Dα,[a,b], we have EF [u] ≥ EG[u]. We conclude that if F α,[a,b′]−D G then
F α,[a,b]−D G.
A.3 Proofs of Section 2.3
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that F α−DCX G. We proceed in four steps.
Step 1 We assert that if u : [a, b] → R+ is decreasing, nonnegative, twice differentiable, with
u′′ > 0 (i.e., u is strictly convex), then there exists a C > 0 large enough such that u+ C is alpha
convex.
From compactness there exists an  > 0 such that for every x ∈ [a, b], we have u′′(x) > . Let
M = α−1
α
max{x∈[a,b]} u′(x)2. Because u is nonnegative, we have that
(
u(x) +
M
︸︷︷︸
C
)
u′′(x) ≥ u′(x)2α− 1
α
for every x ∈ [a, b] .
We conclude that the function u˜ := u+ C is an α-convex function.
Step 2 We assert that if F α−DCX G, then for every decreasing, twice differentiable, and
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strictly convex function u : [a, b]→ R+ we have∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) .
Let u : [a, b] → R+ be decreasing, twice differentiable, and strictly convex. From Step 1, there
exists a C > 0 such that u+ C is α-convex. Therefore, if F α−DCX G we have∫ b
a
u(x) + CdF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x) + CdG(x) ⇐⇒
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) .
Step 3 Define un(x) = u(x) +
1
n
(x − b)2. Clearly un is decreasing, twice differentiable, and
u′′n(x) = u
′′(x) + 2
n
≥ 2
n
, where the last inequality holds because u is convex. Because the sequence
un is bounded and converges pointwise to u. From the dominated convergence theorem we get that
lim
∫ b
a
un(x)dF (x) =
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) and lim
∫ b
a
un(x)dG(x) =
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) .
Step 4 From Step 2 and Step 3, we have that if F α−DCX G then for every decreasing,
twice-differentiable, and convex function u : [a, b] → R+ we have
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x).
From Lemma 4, and a similar argument to the argument in Step 3, the last inequality holds for
every convex and decreasing function u : [a, b]→ R+ such that u′(a) exists and is finite.
A.4 Proofs of Section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix n ∈ N. Let u ∈ Dn,[a,b] with u(b) = 0. Then u 1n is convex.
Thus, from Theorem 2 (see below), we have that u
1
n may be approximated by the functions
{c : max{c− x, 0}}, in the sense that there exists a sequence of functions {um}m such that
um(x) =
m∑
j=1
γjm max{cjm − x, 0}
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and um converges uniformly to u
1
n for some constants γjm ≥ 0, cjm ∈ [a, b]. We have∫ b
a
(um(x))
ndG(x) =
∫ b
a
(
m∑
j=1
γjm max{cjm − x, 0}
)n
dG(x)
=
∫ b
a
∑
k1+...+km=n
n!
m∏
j=1
kj!
m∏
j=1
γ
kj
jm max{cjm − x, 0}kjdG(x)
≤
∫ b
a
∑
k1+...+km=n
n!
m∏
j=1
kj!
m∏
j=1
γ
kj
jm max{cjm − x, 0}kjdF (x) =
∫ b
a
(um(x))
ndF (x).
The second equality follows from the multinomial theorem. The inequality follows from the fact
that F n,[a,b]−S G. Applying the dominated convergence theorem yields∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x),
for every u ∈ Dn,[a,b] with u(b) = 0. To complete the proof, take an arbitrary function v ∈ Dn,[a,b].
Then u(x) := v(x)− v(b) belongs to the set Dn,[a,b] and satisfies u(b) = 0. Thus,∫ b
a
(v(x)− v(b))dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
(v(x)− v(b))dG(x) ⇐⇒
∫ b
a
v(x)dF (x) ≥
∫ b
a
v(x)dG(x) ,
which completes the proof.
We now provide a proof of a well-known result in the literature about approximation of convex
and decreasing functions.
Theorem 2 Let u : [a, b] → R a continuous convex and decreasing function such that u(b) = 0.
Then, there is a sequence (un) of the form un(x) =
n∑
j=1
γj max{cj − x, 0} for some γj ≥ 0 and
cj ∈ [a, b], such that um converges uniformly to u.
Corollary 2 Every decreasing convex function can be approximated by decreasing continuous and
convex functions.
Proof. The proof is by construction and is based on the paper Russell and Seo (1989).
Consider a partition of the interval of the interval [a, b], Pn = [cn, cn−1, . . . , c0] such that ci =
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b− i
n
(b− a) for i = 1, . . . , n. For i = 0, . . . , n− 1 we define
c−1 = b
βi = u(ci)− u(ci−1)
γi =
1
ci − ci+1 (β(i+1) − βi) .
Because ci−1 is the average point between ci, ci−2, by convexity of u we have that
u(ci) + u(ci−2) ≥ 2u(ci−1) ,
which implies that βi ≥ β(i−1) and γi ≥ 0.
Also,
i∑
j=0
γj(cj − ci+1) =
i∑
j=0
cj − ci+1
cj − cj+1 (β(j+1) − βj)
=
i∑
j=0
(i+ 1− j)(β(j+1) − βj) = −(i+ 1)β0 + β1 + β2 + . . .+ β(i+1)
= β1 + . . .+ β(i+1) = u(ci+1)− u(c0)
Because u(c0) = u(b) = 0, we get that
u(ci+1) =
i∑
j=0
γj(cj − ci+1) for every i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 . (13)
Define uˆn(x) :=
∑n−1
j=0 γj max{cj − x, 0}. We claim that for every  > 0 there is a sufficiently
large n such that for every x ∈ [a, b] we have |u(x)− uˆn(x)| < . Indeed, consider x ∈ [a, b], there
is 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 such that x ∈ [ck+1, ck]. Because uˆn is decreasing (γj are nonnegative), we have
uˆn(ck) ≤ uˆn(x) ≤ uˆn(ck+1). Now,
uˆn(ck) =
n−1∑
j=0
γj max{cj − ck, 0} =
k−1∑
j=0
γj(cj − ck) = u(ck) ,
where the second equality comes from Equation (13). The same argument implies that uˆn(ck+1) =
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u(ck+1). Hence, for every k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 we have that
u(ck) ≤ uˆn(x) ≤ u(ck+1) for every x ∈ [ck+1, ck] . (14)
Because u is continuous on [a, b], u is uniformly continuous. Thus, there is a sufficiently high
n such that |u(ck+1) − u(ck)| ≤ . Second, because u is decreasing we have that u(ck) ≤ u(x) ≤
u(ck+1). Using these two facts on inequality (14) allow us to conclude that
|u(x)− uˆn(x)| ≤  for every x ∈ [a, b] .
Proof of Proposition 6. From Lemma 3 (see below), we have that for c1, c2 ∈ [a, b] with c2 ≥ c1
the expression∫ b
a
max{c1 − x, 0}max{c2 − x, 0}dF (x)−
∫ b
a
max{c1 − x, 0}max{c2 − x, 0}dG(x)
is equal to
(c2 − c1)
[ ∫ c1
0
F (x)dx−
∫ c1
0
G(x)dx
]
+ 2
∫ c1
0
(∫ x
0
F (z)dz −
∫ x
0
G(z)dz
)
dx ≥ 0 .
Because the above inequality is linear in c2, we have that it holds for every c2 ∈ [c1, b] if and
only if it holds for c2 = b and for c2 = c1. Evaluating it at these two points we obtain the first and
the second inequalities of Proposition 6, respectively.
Lemma 3 Consider a distribution F on [a, b]. For every c1 ≤ c2 in [a, b] we have that∫ b
a
max{c1 − x, 0}max{c2 − x, 0}dF (x) = (c2 − c1)
∫ c1
a
F (x)dx+ 2
∫ c1
a
∫ x
a
F (z)dzdx .
Proof. Because c1 ≤ c2 we have that∫ b
a
max{c1 − x, 0}max{c2 − x, 0}dF (x) =
∫ c1
a
(c1 − x)(c2 − x)dF (x) (15)
= c2
∫ c1
a
(c1 − x)dF (x)−
∫ c1
a
x(c1 − x)dF (x) . (16)
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Using integration by parts for Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals, we have that∫ c1
a
(c1 − x)dF (x) = (c1 − x)F (x)
∣∣∣c+1
a−
+
∫ c1
a
F (x)dx =
∫ c1
a
F (x)dx , (17)
where the second equality comes from F (a−) = 0.
To tackle the second term in Equation (16), define v(x) :=
∫ x
a
(c1−z)dF (z) for x ∈ [a, c1]. Using
integration by parts and the fact that F (a−) = 0, we have that v(x) = (c1 − x)F (x) +
∫ x
a
F (z)dz.
Define u(x) = x. We have that
∫ c1
a
x(c1 − x)dF (x) =
∫ c1
a
u(x)dv(x). Using integration by parts
and the fact that v(a−) = 0, we obtain∫ c1
a
x(c1 − x)dF (x) =
∫ c1
a
xF (x)dx−
∫ c1
a
∫ x
a
F (z)dzdx .
Once again, using integration by parts, we have that
∫ c1
a
xF (x)dx = c1
∫ c1
a
F (x)dx−∫ c1
a
∫ x
a
F (z)dzdx.
Thus, ∫ c1
a
x(c1 − x)dF (x) = c1
∫ c1
a
F (x)dx− 2
∫ c1
a
∫ x
a
F (z)dzdx . (18)
Therefore, plugging (17) and (18) into Equation (16) we get that∫ c1
a
(c1 − x)(c2 − x)dF (x) = (c2 − c1)
∫ c1
a
F (x)dx+ 2
∫ c1
a
∫ x
a
F (z)dzdx .
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof has two steps. We first show that inequality (5) is a necessary
and sufficient condition for condition (4) to hold. We next prove that it also implies condition (3).
From Corollary 1, we conclude that F 2,[a1,b1]−D G.
Before heading to the proof, by simple algebraic manipulations we obtain that
∫ c
a1
F (x)dx =
(c− a1)2
2(b1 − a1) and
∫ c
a1
G(x)dx =

0 if c ∈ [a1, a2)
(c−a2)2
2(b2−a2) if c ∈ [a2, b2)
c− a2+b2
2
if c ∈ [b2, b1]
.
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And similarly,
∫ c
a1
∫ x
a1
F (z)dzdx =
(c− a1)3
6(b1 − a1) and
∫ c
a1
∫ x
a1
G(z)dzdx =

0 if c ∈ [a1, a2)
(c−a2)3
6(b2−a2) if c ∈ [a2, b2)
(b2−a2)2
6
+ (c−a2)(c−b2)
2
if c ∈ [b2, b1]
.
Step 1. Define h(c) :=
∫ c
a1
∫ x
a1
F (z) − G(z)dzdx, we look for (a1, b1, a2, b2) for which h is
non-negative on [a1, b1]. We separate our analysis in the following subintervals of [a1, b2]:
• For [a1, a2], clearly h(c) is non-negative (independent of the parameters).
• For (a2, b2), we claim that h does not have any local minimum. To see this, suppose by
contradiction that there is such a minimum c∗. Then, because h is twice differentiable we
must have that h′(c∗) = 0 and h′′(c∗) ≥ 0. This two conditions are mutually impossible:
h′(c∗) = 0 ⇐⇒ (c
∗ − a1)2
2(b1 − a1) −
(c∗ − a2)2
2(b2 − a2) = 0 ,
dividing the equation, in each side, by (c
∗−a1)
2
we have that
c∗ − a1
b1 − a1 −
c∗ − a2
c∗ − a1
c∗ − a2
b2 − a2 = 0 .
Because a1 < a2 and c
∗ ∈ (a1, a2), we have that c∗−a2c∗−a1 < 1. Hence,
c∗ − a1
b1 − a1 −
c∗ − a2
b2 − a2 < 0 ⇐⇒ h
′′(c∗) < 0 .
We conclude that h does not have a local minimum on (a2, b2).
• For [b2, b1], we claim that h is strictly concave. Indeed, simple computations lead us to
h′′(c) = −1 + c−a1
b1−a1 , which is negative for c ∈ (b2, b1). By the concavity of h, we have that
h ≥ 0 if and only if h(b2) and h(b1) are positive.
Suppose that h′(b2) ≤ 0. By the concavity of h we have that h is decreasing over [b2, b1].
Thus h ≥ 0 over [b2, b1] if and only if h(b1) ≥ 0.
We assert that if h′(b2) > 0 then h(b2) ≥ 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
h(b2) < 0. Because h(b2) < 0, h
′(b2) > 0 and h(a2) > 0, a local minimum exists over (a2, b2).
37
This contradicts the second bullet. Hence if h′(b2) > 0, then a necessary and sufficient
condition for h ≥ 0 over [b2, b1] is that h(b1) ≥ 0.
We conclude that h ≥ 0 over [b2, b1] if and only if h(b1) ≥ 0.
From the above discussion, we conclude that h(c) ≥ 0 on [a1, b1] if and only if h(b1) ≥ 0. Thus,
condition (4) holds if and only if
(b1 − a1)2 − 3(b1 − b2)(b1 − a2) ≥ (b2 − a2)2 . (19)
Solving for b1 we have that
b1 ≥ 3(a2 + b2)− 2a1 −
√
a22 + 10a2b2 + b
2
2 − 12a1(a2 + b2 − a1)
4
b1 ≤ 3(a2 + b2)− 2a1 +
√
a22 + 10a2b2 + b
2
2 − 12a1(a2 + b2 − a1)
4
.
From Assumption 1 we have that b1 > b2 + a2 − a1. We assert that this implies that the first
inequality always holds. Indeed, observe that
b2 + a2 − a1 − 3(a2 + b2)− 2a1 −
√
a22 + 10a2b2 + b
2
2 − 12a1(a2 + b2 − a1)
4
> b2 + a2 − a1 − 3(a2 + b2)− 2a1
4
=
b2 + a2 − 2a1
4
> 0 ,
where the last inequality follows from a1 < a2 < b2. Therefore, condition (4) holds if and only
inequality (5) holds.
Step 2. We show that condition (4) implies condition (3). Define g(c) := (b1 − c)
∫ c
a1
F (x) −
G(x)dx + 2(
∫ c
a1
∫ x
a1
F (z) − G(z)dzdx). Similar to the first step, we separate our analysis in the
following subintervals of [a1, b2]:
• For [a1, a2], trivially, g is non-negative.
• For [b2, b1], we claim that g is strictly convex. Indeed, g′′(c) = b1−cb1−a1 > 0. Because g
′(b1) =
b2+a2−(b1−a1)
2
, which is strictly negative by Assumption 1, we have that g is decreasing on
[b2, b1]. Therefore, g ≥ 0 on [b2, b1] if and only if 0 ≤ g(b1) = h(b1).
• For the case (a2, b2), we claim that g does not have a local minimum. To prove this, we show
that g is concave. Indeed, for c ∈ (a2, b2) we have that g′′(c) = (b1 − c)( 1b1−a1 − 1b2−a2 ) < 0.
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From the above discussion we conclude that condition (3) holds if and only if h(b2) ≥ 0 which is
equivalent to inequality (5).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let F be the distribution function of X and let G be the distribution
function of Y . Let c ∈ [x1, x4].
In Step 1 we show that condition (4) holds if and only if inequality (7) holds. In Step 2 we
show that if condition (4) holds then condition (3) also holds. Thus, from Corollary 1 inequality
(7) holds if and only if F 2,[a,b]−D G.
Step 1. Condition (4) holds if and only if inequality (7) holds. We consider two cases.
Case 1. x1 ≤ c ≤ x3. If c ≤ x2 condition (4) trivially holds. Suppose that c > x2.
Note that
∫ c
a
max(c− x, 0)2dF (x) = p(c− x1)2 and
∫ c
a
max(c− x, 0)2dG(x) = q(c− x2)2. Thus,
condition (4) holds if
√
p(c−x1) ≥ √q(c−x2) for all x2 ≤ c ≤ x3. The last inequality is linear in c
and clearly holds for c = x2. So it holds for all x2 ≤ c ≤ x3 if it holds for c = x3, i.e., the following
inequality holds: √
p(x3 − x1) ≥ √q(x3 − x2). (20)
Case 2. x3 ≤ c ≤ x4. In this case
∫ c
a
max(c − x, 0)2dF (x) = p(c − x1)2 + (1 − p)(c − x3)2 and∫ c
a
max(c− x, 0)2dG(x) = q(c− x2)2.
Thus, condition (4) holds if
p(c− x1)2 + (1− p)(c− x3)2 ≥ q(c− x2)2 (21)
for all x3 ≤ c ≤ x4. Clearly, inequality (21) with c = x3 is the same as inequality (20), so inequality
(21) holds for all x3 ≤ c ≤ x4 if and only if condition (4) holds.
Consider the convex optimization problem
min
x3≤c≤x4
k(c) := p(c− x1)2 + (1− p)(c− x3)2 − q(c− x2)2.
Note that k′(x4) ≤ 0 if and only if (1−q)x4+qx2 ≤ px1+(1−p)x3 which holds from our assumption
(see inequality (6)). Because k is convex, k′ is increasing on [x3, x4], so k′(c) ≤ 0 for all x3 ≤ c ≤ x4.
Thus, the optimal solution for the optimization problem minx3≤c≤x4 k(c) is c = x4.
This implies that inequality (21) holds for all x3 ≤ c ≤ x4 if and only if k(x4) ≥ 0, i.e.,
p(x4 − x1)2 + (1− p)(x4 − x3)2 ≥ q(x4 − x2)2. (22)
We conclude that condition (4) holds if and only if inequality (22) holds.
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Step 2. Condition (4) implies condition (3). We again consider two cases.
Case 1. x1 ≤ c ≤ x3. If c ≤ x2 condition (3) trivially holds. Suppose that c > x2.
Note that
∫ c
a
max{c−x, 0}max{x4−x, 0}dF (x) = p(c−x1)(x4−x1) and
∫ c
a
max(c−x, 0) max(x4−
x, 0)dG(x) = q(c−x2)(x4−x2). Thus, condition (3) holds if p(c−x1)(x4−x1) ≥ q(c−x2)(x4−x2)
for all x2 ≤ c ≤ x3. The last inequality is linear in c and clearly holds for c = x2. So it holds for
all x2 ≤ c ≤ x3 if it holds for c = x3, i.e., the following inequality holds:
p(x3 − x1)(x4 − x1) ≥ q(x3 − x2)(x4 − x2). (23)
Case 2. x3 ≤ c ≤ x4. In this case,∫ c
a
max(c− x, 0) max(x4 − x, 0)dF (x) = p(c− x1)(x4 − x1) + (1− p)(c− x3)(x4 − x3)
and
∫ c
a
max(c− x, 0) max(x4 − x, 0)dG(x) = q(c− x2)(x4 − x2). Thus, condition (3) holds if
w(c) := p(c− x1)(x4 − x1) + (1− p)(c− x3)(x4 − x3)− q(c− x2)(x4 − x2) ≥ 0
for all x3 ≤ c ≤ x4. Because w(c) linear in c it is enough to check for c = x3 and c = x4 to verify
that w(c) ≥ 0 holds for all x3 ≤ c ≤ x4. Note that
w′(c) = p(x4 − x1) + (1− p)(x4 − x3)− q(x4 − x2)
= qx2 + (1− q)x4 − px1 − (1− p)x3 ≤ 0
where the inequality follows from our assumption. Thus, if w(x4) ≥ 0 then w(c) ≥ 0 holds for all
x3 ≤ c ≤ x4. Inequality (22) implies that w(x4) ≥ 0 so w(x3) ≥ 0, i.e., inequality (23) holds.
Now note that inequality (22) holds if and only if w(x4) ≥ 0. We conclude that condition (4)
implies condition (3).
A.5 Proofs of Section 2.5
We first need the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 Consider a convex and decreasing function u : [a, b] → R such that u′(a) exists and
is finite. Then there is a sequence of infinitely differentiable, decreasing and convex functions
un : [a, b]→ R such that un converges uniformly to u.
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Proof. We first extend u to be defined on all R. Define uˆ : R→ R by
uˆ(x) =

u(a) + u′(a)(x− a) if x < a
u(x) if x ∈ [a, b]
u(b) if x > b
.
By construction the restriction of the function uˆ to [a, b], uˆ|[a,b], is the function u. We claim that
uˆ is decreasing and convex.
• Monotonicity: Because u′(a) ≤ 0, we have that uˆ is decreasing for x < a. For x ∈ [a, b],
uˆ is decreasing because u is decreasing. For x > b, the function is constant. Because
limx→a+ uˆ(x) = u(a) and limx→b− uˆ(x) = u(b), we conclude that uˆ is decreasing on R.
• Convexity: Take x1, x2 ∈ R, with x1 < x2, and λ ∈ (0, 1).
For λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ≥ b, by the monotonicity of uˆ, we have that
uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = u(b) = min
x∈R
uˆ(x).
Hence, uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ λuˆ(x1) + (1− λ)uˆ(x2).
For λx1 + (1−λ)x2 ∈ [a, b], we split to three subcases. If x1, x2 ∈ [a, b], we have uˆ(λx1 + (1−
λ)x2) ≤ λuˆ(x1) + (1− λ)uˆ(x2) because u is convex.
If x1 < a and x2 ∈ [a, b], then λx1 + (1 − λ)x2 = λˆa + (1 − λˆ)x2, with λˆ = λx2−x1x2−a .12 The
12Because λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ∈ [a, x2], we have that λˆ ∈ [0, 1].
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convexity of u implies that13
uˆ(x2)− uˆ(a) ≥ u′(a)(x2 − a)
⇐⇒ (x1 − a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(x1−x2)+(x2−a)
(uˆ(x2)− uˆ(a)) ≤ (x1 − a) u′(a)(x2 − a)
⇐⇒(x1 − x2)(uˆ(x2)− uˆ(a)) ≤ (x2 − a)(u′(a)(x1 − a) + uˆ(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
uˆ(x1)
−uˆ(x2))
⇐⇒x2 − x1
x2 − a (uˆ(a)− uˆ(x2)) ≤ uˆ(x1)− uˆ(x2)
⇐⇒λ x2 − x1
x2 − a︸ ︷︷ ︸
λˆ
(uˆ(a)− uˆ(x2)) ≤ λ (uˆ(x1)− uˆ(x2))
⇐⇒λˆuˆ(a) + (1− λˆ)uˆ(x2) ≤ λuˆ(x1) + (1− λ)uˆ(x2) .
Using that uˆ is convex over [a, b], we obtain
uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = uˆ(λˆa+ (1− λˆ)x2) ≤ λˆuˆ(a) + (1− λˆ)uˆ(x2)
which proves subcase (ii).
Finally, if x2 > b we have
uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)b) ≤ λuˆ(x1) + (1− λ)uˆ(b) = λuˆ(x1) + (1− λ)uˆ(x2)
which proves subcase (iii). The first inequality follows because uˆ is decreasing. The second
inequality follows from subcases (i) and (ii).
For, λx1 + (1− λ)x2 < a we claim that
uˆ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = λuˆ(x1) + (1− λ)(u′(a)(x2 − a) + u(a)) ≤ λuˆ(x1) + (1− λ)uˆ(x2) .
Thus, we need to show that u′(a)(x2 − a) + u(a) ≤ uˆ(x2). If x2 < a, the inequality holds
from the definition of uˆ. If x2 ∈ [a, b] the inequality holds from the convexity of u. If x2 > b
13Because u is convex and differentiable at a, we have u′(a)(x− a) + u(a) ≤ u(x) for every x ∈ [a, b].
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we have that
u′(a)(x2 − a) + u(a) ≤ u′(a)(b− a) + u(a) ≤ uˆ(b) = uˆ(x2).
The first inequality follows because u′(a) ≤ 0. The second inequality follows from the con-
vexity of u.
We prove that uˆ is decreasing and convex. In particular, since a convex function is continuous in
the interior of the domain, we have that uˆ is a continuous function.
The next step is based on a mollification argument (see Appendix C in Evans (2010)). Consider
a mollifier g, with a compact support and define gn(x) = ng(nx). Then,
uˆn(x) = uˆ ∗ gn(x) =
∫
uˆ(x− y)gn(y)dy
is infinitely differentiable. Since uˆ is continuous, we have that uˆn converges uniformly to uˆ on
compact subsets of R (see Appendix C, Theorem 6, in Evans (2010)). In particular, we have that
uˆn converges uniformly to uˆ = u on [a, b].
We assert that uˆn is convex, decreasing, which implies that un := uˆn|[a,b] is convex decreasing,
infinitely differentiable, such that un converges uniformly to u.
Indeed, take x1 < x2 and λ ∈ (0, 1), then:
• Monotonicity: Because uˆ is decreasing and g ≥ 0, we have that for every y,
uˆ(x1 − y)gn(y) ≥ uˆ(x2 − y)gn(y) .
Hence, integrating over y, we obtain that uˆn(x1) ≥ uˆn(x2).
• Convexity: Because uˆ is convex and g ≥ 0, we have that for every y,
uˆ(λx1+(1−λ)x2−y)gn(y) = uˆ(λ(x1−y)+(1−λ)(x2−y))gn(y) ≤ λuˆ(x1−y)gn(y)+(1−λ)uˆ(x2−y)gn(y) .
Hence, integrating over y, we obtain that uˆn(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ λuˆn(x1) + (1− λ)uˆn(x2).
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that F [a,b]−SV F G.
43
Let u ∈ F1. Using integration by parts for a Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral multiple times yield∫ b
a
u(x)d(F −G)(x) = u(x) (F (x)−G(x))
∣∣∣b+
a−
−
∫ b
a
u′(x) (F (x)−G(x)) dx
= −u′(x)
∫ x
a
(F (z)−G(z)) dz
∣∣∣b
a
+
∫ b
a
u′′(x)
∫ x
a
(F (z)−G(z)) dzdx
= u′′(x)
∫ x
a
∫ y
a
(F (z)−G(z)) dzdy
∣∣∣b
a
−
∫ b
a
u′′′(x)
∫ x
a
∫ y
a
(F (z)−G(z)) dzdydx
= u′′(b)
∫ b
a
∫ y
a
(F (z)−G(z)) dzdy −
∫ b
a
u′′′(x)
∫ x
a
∫ y
a
(F (z)−G(z)) dzdydx ≥ 0
which proves the only if part of the theorem. In the second equality we use the fact that F (b+)−
G(b+) = F (a−) − G(a−) = 0. In the third equality we use the fact that u ∈ F2 implies that
u′(b) = 0 (see Proposition 1). The inequality follows from u′′ > 0, u′′′ ≤ 0, and the fact that∫ b
a
max(x− y, 0)2dF (y) ≥
∫ b
a
max(x− y, 0)2dG(y)
for all x ∈ [a, b] if and only if ∫ x
a
∫ y
a
(F (z)−G(z)) dzdy ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [a, b] (see Lemma 3).
Now assume that
∫ b
a
u(x)dF (x) ≥ ∫ b
a
u(x)dG(x) for every function u ∈ F1.
Consider a semi-variance function uc(x) = max{c− x, 0}2 on [a, b]. We claim that there exists
a sequence of functions (un) ∈ F1 such that un converges to uc weakly.
Clearly the function uc is differentiable and the derivative of uc is given by u
′(x) = −2 max{c−
x, 0}. The function u′c is concave and increasing and u′c(a) exists. Hence, from Lemma 4 there exists
a sequence gn of increasing, concave, and infinitely differentiable functions such that gn converges
uniformly to u′c.
14
Define un(x) =
∫ x
a
gn(z)dz−gn(b)x+uc(a), we assert that un ∈ F1. Indeed, u′n(x) = gn(x)−gn(b)
is nonpositive because gn is increasing. Moreover, u
′
n(b) = 0. Also, u
′′
n(x) = g
′
n(x) is nonnegative
because gn is increasing. Finally, u
′′′
n (x) = g
′′
n(x) is nonpositive because gn is concave. From
Proposition 7 we conclude that un ∈ F1.
We claim that un converges weakly to uc. That is, for any distribution function F on [a, b] we
have
∫ b
a
un(x)dF (x)→
∫ b
a
uc(x)dF (x).
Using the dominated convergence theorem and using the fact that limn→∞ gn(b) = u′(b) = 0
14The Lemma states the result for f that is convex, decreasing, such that f ′(a) exists. Clearly, it extends to a
concave, increasing function such that f ′(a) exists.
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yield
lim
n→∞
∫ b
a
un(x)dF (x) = lim
n→∞
∫ b
a
∫ x
a
gn(z)dzdF (x)− lim
n→∞
gn(b)
∫ b
a
xdF (x) + uc(a)
=
∫ b
a
∫ x
a
u′c(z)dzdF (x) + uc(a)
=
∫ b
a
(uc(x)− uc(a))dF (x) + uc(a) =
∫ b
a
uc(x)dF (x).
That is, un converges weakly to uc. Using the fact that un ∈ F1 yields∫ b
a
uc(x)dF (x) = lim
n→∞
∫ b
a
un(x)dF (x) ≥ lim
n→∞
∫ b
a
un(x)dG(x) =
∫ b
a
uc(x)dG(x)
which proves that F [a,b]−SV F G.
Proof of Proposition 7. We first show that F1 ⊆ F2. Let u ∈ F1, then u ∈ D2,[a,b] with a
continuous second derivative. Statements 3. and 5. from Proposition 2 assert that u is convex
and decreasing and u′(b) = 0, respectively. Because u ∈ F1 we have u′′′(x) ≤ 0. We conclude that
u ∈ F2.
We now show the other inclusion F2 ⊆ F1. First consider u ∈ F2 such that u′′(x) > 0 for
x ∈ [a, b], in the following four steps we show that u ∈ F1.
Step 1 Consider the function R(x) = (u(x)−u(b))u
′′(x)
u′(x)2 on (a, b). Because u
′′(x) > 0, and u′(b) = 0,
we have that u′(x) < 0 for x ∈ (a, b). Thus, R is well-defined. Moreover, since u is thrice
differentiable we have that R is differentiable on (a, b). We claim that
R′(x) =
1
u′(x)2
[
− u′(x)u′′(x)(2R(x)− 1) + (u(x)− u(b))u′′′(x)
]
. (24)
45
Indeed, we have
R′(x) =
1
u′(x)4
[
u′(x)3u′′(x) + (u(x)− u(b))u′(x)2u′′′(x)− 2(u(x)− u(b))u′(x)u′′(x)2
]
=
1
u′(x)2
[
u′(x)u′′(x) + (u(x)− u(b))u′′′(x)− 2(u(x)− u(b))u
′′(x)2
u′(x)
]
=
1
u′(x)2
[
u′(x)u′′(x)
(
1− 2 (u(x)− u(b))u
′′(x)
u′(x)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(x)
)
+ (u(x)− u(b))u′′′(x)
]
=
1
u′(x)2
[
− u′(x)u′′(x)(2R(x)− 1) + (u(x)− u(b))u′′′(x)
]
.
Step 2 We claim that lim infx→b− R(x) ≥ 12 . To prove it, notice that limx→b− (u(x)− u(b))u′′(x) =
0 and that limx→b− u′(x)2 = u′(b)2 = 0. Hence, to compute the lim infx→b− R(x) we use a general-
ization of the L’Hopital rule. Thus,
lim inf
x→b−
(u(x)− u(b))u′′(x)
u′(x)2
≥ lim inf
x→b−
u′(x)u′′(x) + (u(x)− u(b))u′′′(x)
2u′(x)u′′(x)
=
1
2
+ lim inf
x→b−
(u(x)− u(b))u′′′(x)
2u′(x)u′′(x)
≥ 1
2
.
The first inequality follows from using a generalization of the L’Hopital rule. To show that the
inequality holds, we assert that for every x < b, we have (u(x)−u(b))u
′′′(x)
2u′(x)u′′(x) ≥ 0. To see this, because
u′′(x) > 0 then u is strictly decreasing, i.e., u′(x) < 0, and u(x) − u(b) > 0. Because u ∈ F2 we
have that u′′′(x) ≤ 0. Thus, (u(x)−u(b))u′′′(x)
2u′(x)u′′(x) ≥ 0. We conclude that lim infx→b− (u(x)−u(b))u
′′′(x)
2u′(x)u′′(x) ≥ 0
which proves Step 2.
Step 3 We claim that for every x ∈ (a, b) we have R(x) ≥ 1
2
. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that there is y ∈ (a, b) such that R(y) < 1
2
. Let z = inf{w ∈ [y, b]|R(w) > R(y)}.
From Step 2, we have that lim infx→b− R(x) ≥ 12 > R(y). Hence, z ∈ [y, b). The continuity of R
implies that R(z) = R(y) < 1
2
. From the definition of the infimum we have that
∀ > 0 ∃w ∈ (z, z + ) such that R(w) > R(y) = R(z). (25)
Because u ∈ F2 and u′′(x) > 0, we have that u(z) − u(b) > 0, u′(z) < 0, u′′(z) > 0, and
u′′′(z) ≤ 0. These inequalities together with R(z) < 1
2
, imply that R′(z) < 0 (see Equation (24) in
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Step 1). Thus,
∃ > 0 such that ∀w ∈ (z, z + ) R(w) < R(z). (26)
conditions (25) and (26) are mutually impossible. Therefore, we conclude that for every x ∈ (a, b),
R(x) ≥ 1
2
.
Step 4 We claim that u ∈ F1. From Step 3, we have that for every x ∈ (a, b), R(x) ≥ 12 . Using
characterization for an α-convex function that is twice differentiable, we conclude that u ∈ D2,[a,b].
Because u ∈ F2, we have that u′′′(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ [a, b]. We conclude that if u′′ > 0 and
u ∈ F2, then u ∈ F1.
We are in position to prove that F2 ⊆ F1. Take any u ∈ F2. For  > 0 define u˜ = u+ (b−x)2.
Clearly, u˜ is thrice differentiable. Notice that for every x ∈ [a, b] we have that u˜′(x) = u′(x) −
2(b − x) ≤ 0, u˜′(b) = u′(b) = 0, u˜′′ (x) = u′′(x) + 2 > 0, and u˜′′′ (x) = u′′′(x) ≤ 0. Thus, u˜ ∈ F2
satisfying u˜′′ (x) > 0 for x ∈ (a, b). From the previous four steps we conclude that u˜ ∈ F1. Thus,
u˜ ∈ D2,[a,b]. Because u˜ → u when → 0 under the pointwise topology, Proposition 2 (Statement
2) implies that u ∈ D2,[a,b]. Because u′′′ ≤ 0, we conclude that u ∈ F1.
A.6 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 9. (i) Define the function gs : [0, y] → R+ by gs(y) := u′(Rs + y) for all
0 ≤ s ≤ x. First note that gs(y) is a 2, [0, Rx+ y −Rs]-convex function.
To see this, note that
gs(y)− gs(Rx+ y −Rs) = u′ (Rs+ y)− u′(Rx+ y)
is 2-convex because u′ is 2, [0, Rx+ y]-convex and 0 ≤ Rs+ y ≤ Rx+ y for 0 ≤ y ≤ Rx−Rs+ y¯.
From Lemma 5 (see below), F 2,[0,Rx+y]−S G implies that F 2,[0,Rx−Rs+y]−S G for all s ∈ [0, x].
Let hs(s, q) be the derivative of h with respect to s. Let s ∈ [0, x]. We have
hs(s, F ) = −u′ (x− s) + β
∫ y
0
u′(Rs+ y)dF (y)
= −u′(x− s) +
∫ y
0
gs (y) dF (y)
≥ −u′ (x− s) +
∫ y
0
gs(y)dG(y) = hs(s,G),
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where the inequality follows from the facts that F 2,[0,Rx−Rs+y]−S G and that gs(y) is 2, [0, Rx−
Rs+ y¯] convex. Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) implies that g(F ) ≥ g(G).
(ii) Let b > 0 and γ ≥ 0. Note that u′(x) = x−γ + γb−γ−1x, u′′(x) = −γx−γ−1 + γb−γ−1,
u′′′(x) = γ(γ + 1)x−γ−2, and u′′′′(x) = −γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)x−γ−3.
Thus, u′′ ≤ 0, u′′′ ≥ 0, u′′′′ ≤ 0 and u′′(b) = 0. Now apply Proposition 7 to conclude that u′ is
a 2, [0, b]-convex function.
Lemma 5 Let F and G be two distributions. Suppose that F 2,[a,b]−S G. Then F 2,[a,b′]−S G
for all b′ ∈ (a, b).
Proof. Assume that F 2,[a,b]−S G. Let b′ ∈ (a, b) and c ∈ [a, b′].
Note that F 2,[a,b]−S G implies
∫ c
a
(∫ x
a
(F (z)−G(z))dz) dx ≥ 0. Thus, condition (4) holds.
If
∫ c
a
(F (x)−G(x))dx ≥ 0 then
(b′ − c)
[∫ c
a
(F (x)−G(x))dx
]
+ 2
∫ c
a
(∫ x
a
(F (z)−G(z))dz
)
dx ≥ 0.
If
∫ c
a
(F (x)−G(x))dx < 0 then
(b′ − c)
[∫ c
a
(F (x)−G(x))dx
]
+ 2
∫ c
a
(∫ x
a
(F (z)−G(z))dz
)
dx
≥ (b− c)
[∫ c
a
(F (x)−G(x))dx
]
+ 2
∫ c
a
(∫ x
a
(F (z)−G(z))dz
)
dx ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows because F 2,[a,b]−S G. So condition (3) holds.
We conclude that condition (3) and (4) hold for all c ∈ [a, b′]. Thus, F 2,[a,b′]−S G.
Proof of Proposition 11. Step 1. e2(θ) = argmax
e2∈E
e1e2 − e
k+1
2
(k+1)(1−θ)l is decreasing and α, [0, 1]-
convex. Let h(e2) = e1e2− e
k+1
2
(k+1)(1−θ)l . It is easy to see that h is strictly concave. Because θ ∈ [0, 1),
we have h′ (1) = e1 − 1(1−θ)l ≤ 0 for all e1 ∈ E. In addition h′(0) = e1 ≥ 0 for all e1 ∈ E.
We conclude that the first order condition h′(e2) = 0 holds for all for all e1 ∈ E. The first
order condition implies that e1 − e
k
2
(1−θ)l = 0. Thus, e2(θ) = e
1/k
1 (1− θ)l/k is a decreasing and an
α, [0, 1]-convex function when l ≥ αk.
Step 2. Denote by ∆([0, 1]) the set of all distributions over [0, 1]. Define the operator y :
48
E ×∆([0, 1])→ E by
y(e, F ) = argmax
e1∈E
∫ 1
0
(e1e˜2(θ, e)− c1(e1))dF (θ)
s.t. e˜2(θ, e) = argmax
e2∈E
ee2 − e
k+1
2
(k + 1) (1− θ)l .
We now show that the operator y is increasing on E × ∆([0, 1]) where ∆([0, 1]) is endowed with
the α, [0, 1]-convex stochastic order, i.e., y(e′, F ′) ≥ y(e, F ) for all e′ ≥ e and F ′ α,[0,1]−D F .
Suppose that e′ ≥ e and fix F ∈ ∆([0, 1]). Since e˜2(θ, e) is increasing in e for all θ ∈
[0, 1) (this follows from a standard comparative statics argument, see Topkis (1978)), we have∫ 1
0
e˜2(θ, e
′)dF (θ) ≥ ∫ 1
0
e˜2(θ, e)dF (θ), which implies that y(e, F ) ≥ y(e′, F ). Now suppose that
F ′ α,[0,1]−D F , and fix e ∈ E. From Step 1, e˜2(θ, e) is α, [0, 1]-convex and decreasing. Thus,∫ 1
0
e˜2(θ, e
′)dF ′(θ) ≥ ∫ 1
0
e˜2(θ, e)dF (θ), which implies that y(e, F
′) ≥ y(e, F ).
Step 3. From Step 2, y : E ×∆([0, 1])→ E is an increasing map from the complete lattice E
into E. From Corollary 2.5.2 in Topkis (2011), the greatest fixed point of y exists and is increasing
in F on ∆([0, 1]).
Let e¯1(F ) = y(e¯1(F ), F ) be the greatest fixed point of y. Let (e¯1(F ), e¯2(θ, F )) be the corre-
sponding BNE, i.e., e¯1(F ) = y(e¯1(F ), F ) and e¯2(θ, F ) = e˜2(θ, e¯1(F )). Thus, if F
′ α,[0,1]−D F we
have
m(F ′) = e¯1(F ′)e¯2(θ, F ′) = e¯1(F ′)e˜2(θ, e¯1(F ′)) ≥ e¯1(F )e˜2(θ, e¯1(F ′)) ≥ e¯1(F )e˜2(θ, e¯1(F )) = m(F ).
The first inequality follows from the fact that the greatest fixed point of y is increasing in F . The
second inequality follows from the fact that e˜2(θ, e) is increasing in e.
This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 12. For t = 1/3 the right-hand-side inequality follows from Example 3.
For t ≥ 1
3
the right-hand-side inequality follows from the fact that f is decreasing.
We now prove the left-hand-side of the inequality. Let f ∈ D2,[a,b] and a < b.
From Lemma 1 we have
1
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x) ≥ 1
bn − an
∫ bn
an
f (x) dx (27)
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for all (an, bn) such that
4b ≤ 3 (an + bn)− 2a+
√
a2n + 10anbn + b
2
n − 12a (an + bn − a) (28)
and a < an < bn < b. Now suppose that (an, bn)
∞
n=1 is a sequence of numbers such that an → θ
and bn → θ, and inequality (28) and the inequalities a < an < bn < b hold for all n. We have
1
b− a
∫ b
a
f (x) dx ≥ lim
n→∞
1
bn − an
∫ bn
an
f(x)dx = lim
n→∞
1
bn − anf(ζn)(bn − an) = f (θ) . (29)
The first equality follows from the mean value theorem for integrals (note that f is continuous on
[an, bn] because it is convex on [a, b]). The second equality follows since ζn ∈ (an, bn) for all n.
Let 0 < λ < 1 be such that θ = λb + (1 − λ)a. Suppose that 0 < λ < 1 is chosen such that
inequality (28) holds as equality when an → θ and bn → θ. We have
4b = 6θ − 2a+
√
12θ2 − 12a(2θ − a)
= 6 (λb+ (1− λ) a)− 2a+
√
12 (λb+ (1− λ) a)2 − 12a(2(λb+ (1− λ) a)− a)
⇔ 4b− 4a = 6λ (b− a) +
√
12(λb+ (1− λ) a− a)2
⇔ 2b− 2a = 3λ (b− a) +
√
3λ (b− a)
⇔ λ = 2
3 +
√
3
.
From inequality (29) and the fact that f is decreasing we have
f (γb+ (1− γ) a) ≤ f
(
2
3 +
√
3
b+
(
1− 2
3 +
√
3
)
a
)
≤ 1
b− a
∫ b
a
f (x) dx
for all γ ≥ 2
3+
√
3
. This completes the proof of the Proposition.
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